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 SERIOUS VIOLENT OFFENDERS: DEVELOPING A RISK 
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK  
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
• In order to establish a complementary language of risk across all agencies, it is 
recommended that the Scottish Government and the Risk Management Authority 
actively disseminate MAPPA guidance through the RMA’s specialist training programme 
and through the development of protocols and memoranda of agreement; 
• Prior to a violent offender framework being implemented, an audit of existing numbers, 
staffing, budgetary and other resources should be undertaken across the Community 
Justice Authorities to ascertain projected needs; 
• So as to ensure that resources are targeted appropriately and that movement between 
categories of offender and levels of risk are encouraged, monitoring of risk classifications 
and risk categories should be undertaken on an annual basis. The MAPPA 
arrangements should be evaluated within 12-24 months of the implementation of a 
violent offender framework and regularly thereafter; 
• Consistent and effective multi-agency working requires compatibility of individual agency 
powers, statutory responsibilities, IT requirements and training in order to facilitate joint 
assessments and the effective enforcement of the legislation; 
• Training, in agency remits and responsibilities, in concepts and theories of risk and risk 
formulation, in the use of specialist tools and in the statutory and other requirements 
which facilitate multi-agency working, needs to be funded and undertaken centrally via 
the Scottish Government and the Risk Management Authority; 
• Given the heterogeneity of violent offending and the need to target both offenders and 
resources appropriately, the Risk Management Authority will need to consult with 
Criminal Justice policy makers and practitioners about the adoption of a single initial risk 
assessment tool and evaluate its use and effectiveness after a two year period. Minimum 
standards for referral and for panel information should also be devised and 
disseminated; 
• The development of comprehensive risk management plans, informed by risk 
assessment and risk formulation, should be encouraged and reviewed by the Risk 
Management Authority and should also be evaluated in respect of their impact on 
recidivism. 
METHODS 
 
This research aimed to evaluate current and developing research, policy and practice in 
order to inform a possible framework for assessing risk of violence in Scotland, not only 
within MAPPA but also across the board within criminal justice agencies. The study utilised 
two main methods: a literature review and qualitative interviews with 24 key personnel in all 
the relevant agencies, including SPS, the Police, Social Work, victim agencies and Mental 
Health. These interviews explored differing definitions of risk of violence, current and 
potential policy and practice in assessing risk of violence, the strengths and limitations of 
MAPPA, organisational issues (including multi-agency working), and the key issues for 
agencies in assessing violence risk. The literature review explored similar themes both to 
complement and inform the qualitative data. 
 
THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Overall, the literature review shows that definitions of risk, violence and risk assessment 
remain far from straightforward, although there are common themes. Terms such as ‘high 
risk’ mean different things in different contexts and violent offenders can be difficult to 
‘compartmentalise’ either from other types of offenders (e.g., sexual offenders) or from other 
violent offenders (e.g., perpetrators of domestic violence). Violence risk assessment has a 
tendency to focus primarily on prediction of risk but the literature suggests that assessment 
is more effectively used as a guide for treatment and management, not least where 
adequate structures, supports and training are in place. 
 
DEFINING THE ISSUES 
 
The MAPPA classifications of risk, whilst welcomed as a guide, were seen to be open to 
interpretation and thus failed to offer definitive criteria for inclusion or exclusion of certain 
offence or offender types. One classification system and one working definition of harm 
across all agencies would therefore be beneficial. The proposed implementation of the 
LS/CMI risk assessment tool, which combines assessments of risk of reoffending and of risk 
of harm, will offset any confusion over who to target within the violent offender group, 
although clear guidelines as to how to progress different types of offence, offender and risk 
will be needed beyond the initial assessment stage. 
 
Competing agency remits and philosophies were evident amongst the key agencies of 
Social Work, SPS, Police and Mental Health. Whereas Social Work tended to focus on the 
offender and his/her rehabilitation, SPS focused on containment within an institutional 
context although was increasingly aware of the need to look beyond that to the throughcare 
of offenders on release. The Police tended to take a longer term view of the assessment and 
management of convicted as well as unconvicted offenders but also tended to rely on tools 
rather than on professional judgement in making assessments of risk, not least given their 
concern primarily to protect the public. 
 
A tension was evident amongst respondents about the Mental Health emphasis on treating 
the ‘patient’ rather than necessarily assessing risk more widely. Respondents further 
identified a need for health colleagues to broaden their criteria in terms of who they will work 
with and under what circumstances. Victim agencies wished to be more included in the risk 
assessment process, albeit within the confines of data protection requirements, and their 
perceptions of risk were deemed a valuable addition to risk formulation, not least when the 
‘victim’ and the ‘offender’ can often be the same individual. 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT IN PRACTICE 
 
Risk assessments were undertaken for both rehabilitative reasons (focusing on the needs of 
the offender) and operational reasons (focusing on the requirements of the agency). Social 
Work, the Police and SPS seemed more likely to combine these functions of risk 
assessment, whilst mental health staff were perhaps more able to focus on the rehabilitative 
approach because of their more medical remit, their longer involvement with, in particular, in-
patients, and their seemingly greater access to resources. Risk assessment tools were not 
always familiar to each agency, not least since such tools are not currently standardised 
across all agencies, although the introduction and roll out of LS/CMI should address agency 
concerns about the assessment and management of violent offenders. Certainly, most 
respondents welcomed one standardised tool for initial assessments although stressed the 
need for any subsequent, more specialised, assessments to accommodate diversity, not 
only of offender types but also of agency remits and constituents. 
 
Movement of offenders between MAPPA categories and levels of risk was currently quite 
limited, not least in terms of downgrading risk. This will obviously have implications for risk 
management of violent offenders who, once introduced into MAPPA, would have the 
potential to ‘swamp’ the system. The fears of respondents about the number of violent 
offenders who would be eligible for MAPPA inclusion may be unfounded, without a 
systematic audit of existing numbers, but concerns remained that violent offenders could not 
be subsumed within existing MAPPA arrangements without further financial resources and 
programme interventions. 
 
Inter-agency cooperation was viewed as very constructive and currently effective in respect 
of formal arrangements for sex offenders and informal arrangements for other offenders. The 
introduction of MAPPA procedures for sex offenders seems to have been helpful both in 
terms of increased information sharing and increased confidence due to joint decision 
making and shared responsibility taking. Whilst all agencies expressed a desire for greater 
understanding across agencies of their roles, remits and cultures in meeting multi-agency 
expectations, it was acknowledged that there were often variations in culture, policy or 
practice which created challenges for inter-agency cooperation. Quality assurance 
mechanisms were seen to be augmented by multi-agency working, although accountability 
may be less clear within a multi-agency forum such as MAPPA where the roles of the 
Strategic Management Boards and MAPPA coordinators were sometimes ambiguous. 
Respondents both welcomed and highlighted the need to have clear guidelines from the 
Scottish Government and the Risk Management Authority on risk levels, not only for staff 
across the main agencies but also for sentencers. Clear guidelines, protocols and legislation 
would ensure better quality assurance and accountability systems across agencies and 
geographical boundaries. Limited resources (both interventions and funding) and 
incompatible IT systems for sharing information were seen as a potential barrier to multi-
agency effectiveness, as was the lack of national, multi-agency training in concepts of risk 
and approaches to risk assessment and management in relation to violent offenders. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The lessons learned from current MAPPA arrangements will no doubt greatly inform the 
implementation of a violence risk assessment framework. Respondents generally felt that 
the framework used for sex offenders currently within MAPPA could be replicated for violent 
offenders, but existing MAPPA arrangements would need to be fit for purpose through 
having a standardised initial risk assessment tool, clear criteria for the target group, and 
further national training in risk classifications and assessment and management procedures. 
 
The findings from this report suggest that the ‘subtlety of violence’ is indeed a challenge to 
both risk classification, assessment and management, but the strong commitment within and 
between agencies should further the aims of multi-agency arrangements such as MAPPA 
and build on the success of MAPPA to date in addressing the needs of offenders, agency 
personnel and the wider public. 
CHAPTER 1. 
 
THE CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Current Scottish multi-agency arrangements for the assessment and management of 
violent offenders are at an early stage of development. Whilst Multi-Agency Public 
Protection Arrangements (MAPPAs) have been in place in England and Wales since 
2001 for those charged with, or convicted of, violent or sexual offences, MAPPAs did 
not come on stream in Scotland until April 2007. Whilst MAPPAs require the Scottish 
Prison Service, local authorities and the police to cooperate formally in the assessment 
and management of risk, their remit is more limited in scope than that operating in 
England and Wales. Currently in Scotland, only those convicted on indictment for 
sexual offences are the focus of the existing arrangements, and whilst the current 
arrangements for sex offenders within MAPPA seem to be working effectively in terms 
of multi-agency risk assessment and management, they are limited in their scope. Not 
only is it the case that pre-conviction cases fall outside the remit of Scottish MAPPAs, 
it is also the case that many individuals found guilty of specifically violent offences 
(e.g., domestic abuse) and those sexual and violent offences convicted in the 
summary courts are not formally included in these statutory multi-agency 
arrangements for risk assessment and management. 
 
1.2 Due to the widening role of MAPPAs in Scotland to include violent offenders, the Risk 
Management Authority commissioned this research to develop a framework for the 
assessment of violent offenders with whom agencies currently work under existing 
multi-agency arrangements. For example, such a framework might include a 
standardised tool for use by all relevant agencies across Scotland. An effective 
standardised tool currently does not exist for violent offenders, not least because such 
offenders do not necessarily specialise in one type of offence. Prediction of further 
violent offending, rather than offending in general, can therefore be difficult (Loucks, 
2002). 
 
1.3 Given the wide-ranging remits of the various partner organisations, their own 
organisational cultures and constituencies and the current tendency towards reactive 
rather than proactive practice, it is important that a coherent, robust and genuinely 
inter-disciplinary risk assessment framework for violent offenders is developed which 
promotes reliable, structured, consistent and holistic approaches to reducing and 
managing such risk across all agencies. Such a framework needs to be based on 
agreed definitions and rankings of risk, and it is hoped that this report can form the 
foundation upon which such commonalities and improvements are made. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
1.4 In a review of risk assessment on behalf of the Scottish Executive, Barry (2007) noted 
that differences between organisational cultures, definitions of risk, and a hierarchy of 
professional expertise prevent the development of a common understanding and 
language of risk. Barry found little consistency in practice in criminal justice, despite 
the fact that the field is relatively advanced in terms of inter-agency collaboration. She 
explains that “The culture of the various organisations… is doubtless an influence on 
the way risk is perceived and managed within each agency, making the gains from 
collaboration less obvious” (ibid: ii).  
 
1.5 Inconsistencies in risk assessment and management have clear implications for 
practice. The Inspectorate of Probation (HMIP 2006) in England and Wales has 
provided consistent and quantitative evidence of shortcomings in work done on risk of 
serious harm. An enquiry following the murder of Naomi Bryant in August 2005 
reported that no single act of negligence or deficiency was responsible for the failure in 
risk management under MAPPA, but rather it was a cumulative failure of processes 
and actions throughout an offender’s sentence supervision, both in prison and in the 
community. The review reinforced the importance of having an integrated offender 
management system throughout a sentence, with clear and consistent practice 
between the three core MAPPA agencies (probation, prisons and the police) (HM 
Chief Inspector of Probation, 2006). 
 
1.6 This is equally the case in Scotland. In 2006, for example, the Mental Welfare 
Commission reported on an enquiry into a murder of one psychiatric outpatient by 
another. The enquiry reported a number of systematic deficiencies, including no 
systematic approach to risk assessment in the offender’s care and supervision and no 
satisfactory risk assessment, risk management plan or strategy to deal with any 
relapse in his illness. Deficiencies in communication, training, supervision, and 
information were also evident. 
 
1.7 More recently, the Social Work Inspection Agency (SWIA) released a series of 
criticisms about standards of risk assessment and management. SWIA (2007) 
reported that just under 40% of the social enquiry reports (SERs) across Scotland 
reached a fully acceptable standard, with deficits primarily in the quality of the analysis 
of offending and related risk assessment and in the way in which this, along with other 
relevant information, was used to inform the reports’ conclusions. SWIA went on to say 
that the authors of SERs relied too frequently on the offender’s version of the offence 
with little further investigation and analysis.  
 
1.8 SWIA (2007) noted that work with serious violent offenders was not strong, both when 
compared to work with sex offenders but also in comparison with offenders as a whole. 
The report stated that analysis of risk of harm was ‘poor’ in a significant proportion of 
reports on serious violent offenders. About three-quarters of these offenders had 
action plans in place for the first three months of supervision, but SWIA expressed 
concern about the quality of subsequent supervision. Supervision of serious violent 
offenders predominantly took the form of individual non-programme work, much of 
which SWIA said failed to address their offending. While some local authorities ran 
their own domestic violence or short anger management programmes, no accredited 
or approved programmes were available for addressing violent behaviour, and with no 
immediate prospect of any being introduced. Further, supervising officers made 
checks on offenders’ living arrangements in only 38% of cases. 
 
1.9 SWIA’s report called for more effective risk assessment and management and more 
options to help offenders to address their offending. The report expressed concern that 
sound risk assessment practice was not adequately informing SER authors’ 
assessments of the risks of re-offending and harm. It criticised the guidance to staff on 
risk assessment as well as the standard and immediacy of training. SWIA found that 
some staff were undertaking risk assessments without having completed the 
necessary training at all, and some staff resisted using any structured risk assessment 
tools. The report also identified weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation, lack of up-
to-date service level agreements (SLAs) in many areas, and lack of clear and 
measurable targets and outcomes or performance monitoring information where SLAs 
were in place.  
 
1.10 SWIA (2007) made some positive comments, however, such as the fact that 
supervision plans were in place in over three-quarters of the case files and in over 
60% of files in even the poorest performing areas. The variation in quality of the plans 
came under criticism, however, as did the quality of related risk assessments. The 
Inspectors noted frequent failures of services to review offenders’ supervision plans 
and progress in achieving identified goals and tasks according to National Standards. 
SWIA believed this led to a considerable amount of ‘drift’ as well as to reactive rather 
than pro-active practice. The report concluded with a call for more local authorities to 
develop effective risk assessment practices, particularly for the highest-risk offenders, 
and noted plans from the Risk Management Authority to develop a multi-agency risk 
assessment framework for use with violent offenders – the task of the current review. 
Barry (2007) notes that, despite such findings from the literature, recent developments 
in risk assessment tools and procedures are working to encourage both consistency of 
approach and the active participation of offenders in ongoing risk assessment and 
management.   Similarly the development of accredited programmes both in prison 
and in the community also ensures that the offender is involved in an ongoing self-
assessment of risk and in joint decision making in relation to risk management. 
 
1.11 As noted above, MAPPA provisions for violent offenders under the Criminal Justice Act 
(Scotland) 2003 are due to be introduced once a consistent approach to risk 
assessment and management of this group is identified (Scottish Executive Justice 
Department, 2006). Again, the task of the current review is largely to assist in 
developing a more consistent and informed approach to the assessment and 
management of violent offenders, including restricted patients (Scottish Executive et 
al, 2006). 
 
1.12 Kemshall’s (1998) concept of ‘defensible decision-making’ should be central to all 
approaches to the assessment and management of risk amongst violent offenders. 
The Scottish Government (2007b) reiterates these criteria for a defensible decision as: 
• Ensuring decisions are grounded in the evidence 
• Using reliable risk assessment tools 
• Collecting, verifying, and evaluating information thoroughly 
• Recording and accounting for decisions 
• Communicating with relevant others and seeking additional information 
• Staying within agency policies and procedures 
• Taking all reasonable steps  
• Matching interventions for risk management to risk factors 
• Maintaining contact with offenders at level commensurate with the level of risk of 
harm, and 
• Responding to escalating risk, deteriorating behaviour, and non-compliance 
(source: Kemshall, 1998). 
1.13 Defensible decision making is clearly an important part of the management of risk, but 
should not be conflated with ‘defensive’ decision making, which may result in 
precautionary and restrictive practices in both assessment and management. 
Defensible decision making can better achieve public protection, rehabilitation, and the 
engagement and compliance of offenders (Wood & Kemshall, 2007). 
 
1.14 Thus far in Scotland, the MacLean Committee (2000), the Cosgrove Committee’s work 
on sex offenders (2001), the Millan Committee’s work on mentally disordered 
offenders (2001) and the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) Act 1999 have 
had the most impact on violence risk assessment and management. These 
developments place particular duties and obligations on staff in criminal justice, social 
work and health regarding risk assessment and management of high-risk offenders 
(Kemshall, 2002). 
 
1.15 A number of structures are in place in Scotland to assist with defensible decision 
making, as well as models available from elsewhere in the UK and internationally. 
Much of the recent focus on this in the UK has been through the development of 
MAPPA, as described below. 
MAPPA 
 
1.16 Scott and colleagues (2007) see MAPPA not as an agency but as a set of national 
arrangements that require each participant to ensure that their own practice is effective 
and equally that their collaboration is effective in assessing and managing the risk 
posed by sexual and violent offenders. This process has been described as the 
identification of stages on a journey rather than a destination reached (ibid). 
 
1.17 The MAPPA guidance in England and Wales (National Probation Service, 2004a) and 
in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2007b) identifies three categories of offenders who 
are subject to the MAPPA process. Category 1 consists of registered sex offenders 
who have been convicted or cautioned of certain sexual offences and who are required 
to register with the police. Category 2 is made up of violent and other sex offenders 
convicted on indictment of an offence inferring personal violence who are subject to 
probation or licence supervision, and those acquitted on grounds of insanity or found 
to be insane following indictment proceedings1. Finally, Category 3 consists of other 
offenders whom the Responsible Authority considers to pose a risk of serious harm to 
the public. Each of these categories of offenders is then divided into three assessed 
levels of risk. Level 1 consists of offenders believed to require ordinary risk 
management, usually by a single agency at local level, such as probation supervision. 
MAPPA Level 2 requires multi-agency risk management, but again at a local level. 
Level 3, requiring national Multi-Agency Public Protection Panels, is technically 
reserved for the ‘critical few of the critical few’ (National Probation Service, 2004b) who 
pose the highest risk. 
 
1.18 The Management of Offenders Etc. (Scotland) Act 2005 imposes a statutory duty on a 
wide range of local and national agencies to cooperate with MAPPA. The responsibility 
for identifying offenders within the three MAPPA categories lies with the agency that 
deals with them initially. The ‘responsible authority’ for offenders varies according to 
their status. For example, the Prison Service is the responsible authority for those in 
prison, whilst the health service is responsible for those who are mentally ill, even 
where they are not restricted patients (Scottish Government, 2007a; also Scottish 
Executive Justice Department, 2006), the police for registered sex offenders, and the 
local authority for those offenders convicted on indictment and subject to a probation 
order for a violent offence or who will be subject to supervision on release from prison 
(Scottish Government, 2007b). 
 
1.19 At the time of writing (November, 2007), MAPPA procedures had only been in place in 
Scotland for eight months, and only in relation to sex offenders, so longer-term 
statistics were only available from England and Wales. In 2004/05, MAPPAs in 
England and Wales managed about 45,600 offenders (Ministry of Justice, 2007). Of 
the total number of offenders in MAPPA, 66% were registered sex offenders (category 
1), 28% were violent or other sex offenders (category 2), while the remaining 6% were 
other offenders (category 3; ibid). Most offenders managed under MAPPA procedures 
will be dealt with through local panels. A national panel also exists to co-ordinate the 
re-settlement of offenders who cannot be safely located in their home area or region 
(National Probation Service, 2004b). 
 
                                                 
1 Current practice would tend to refer to such people as ‘mentally ill’ rather than insane. 
1.20 Realistically, not all offenders can receive high levels of supervision and research on 
‘the risk principle' suggests that such intervention across the board would be 
inappropriate, with only those offenders assessed as being at higher risk being likely to 
benefit from high levels of supervision (Andrews and Bonta, 1994). The National 
Probation Service in England and Wales (2005d) consequently directs probation areas 
to be clear about allocating only those offenders who need ‘active’ risk management of 
serious harm, or notoriety, to Levels 2 or 3 of MAPPA. 
 
1.21 In England and Wales, Registered Sex Offenders continue to form by far the largest 
category of offenders within MAPPA (Scott et al, 2007). In saying this, the majority of 
offenders within MAPPA (71%) are not assessed as posing a significant risk of serious 
harm to the public and can therefore be managed effectively at Level 1 (in other words, 
under normal methods of supervision such as through local probation teams). Level 3, 
in contrast, makes up the highest level of risk management, focussing on the most 
complex offenders, or the ‘critical few’ (most recently about 3% of the total caseload in 
MAPPA; see also Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, 2005), and involves 
senior managers within each area. The rate of serious reoffending for the intensively 
managed group has been very low and, though numbers are small, suggests that this 
method of risk management has been effective (Scott et al, 2007). 
 
1.22 In Scotland, the Prison Service (SPS) is responsible at the start of a sentence for 
identifying and designating a local authority which will be responsible for the 
supervision of offenders who are subject to a period of post release supervision 
(Scottish Government, 2007b). The SPS has instigated a multi-disciplinary Integrated 
Case Management (ICM) process for this purpose, which the Scottish Government 
(2007a) has identified as crucial in the development of a community focused risk 
management plan and in the provision of relevant information from the prison to 
MAPPA. On release, the prisoner’s assessed level of risk and needs, as well as the 
specific requirements of any licence or order, determine levels of contact with the 
supervising officer, the nature of that contact, and the interventions in which they will 
be required to participate (ibid). Violent offenders not subject to supervision on release 
do not automatically fall within MAPPA. The assumption is that in most cases the court 
will impose the sentence according to the information available to it at the time, 
including the offender’s risk of harm. However, subsequent assessment during 
custody, such as in assessment for eligibility for Home Detention Curfew, may reveal a 
need to refer a prisoner to the SPS Risk Management Group who will then consider if 
the prisoners should be referred for consideration to MAPPA (Scottish Government, 
2007b). 
 
1.23 Clear approaches to and methods for violence risk assessment are central to risk 
management and consequently to protection of the public. To that end, this report aims 
to further the already growing level of inter-agency cooperation and good practice with 
sex offenders so as to inform a risk of violence assessment framework in Scotland. 
 
LAYOUT OF THE REPORT 
1.24 This report comprises 6 chapters as follows. Chapter 2 describes the aims and 
objectives of the research and outlines the methods used to address these. Chapter 3 
gives an overview of the international literature review and Chapter 4 explores the 
issues of classification of offenders and harm, and definitions of violence and sets 
these within the different organisational structures, cultures and remits of the varying 
agencies concerned. Chapter 5 looks at the more practical aspects of risk assessment, 
including perceptions of tools, reasons for undertaking risk assessments and 
organisational issues such as accountability, quality assurance and training, as well as 
exploring multi-agency working and barriers to effective inter-agency cooperation. 
Finally, Chapter 6 draws together the conclusions from the research and provides 
recommendations for implementing a framework for risk of violence assessment and 
management. 
CHAPTER 2. 
 
AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND METHODS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
2.1 As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Risk Management Authority commissioned this 
research to evaluate developments in assessing violence risk internationally and to 
establish how agencies in Scotland currently define risk and work with violent 
offenders. The ultimate intention of the research was to explore the feasibility of a 
framework to assess the risks posed by violent offenders from initial screening, through 
in-depth risk assessment and risk formulation, to risk management. This chapter 
describes the methods used by the research team in addressing this task. 
 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
 
2.2 The aims of the research were to evaluate current and developing research, policy and 
practice in relation to assessing risk of violence and to explore the feasibility of a 
common risk assessment framework for violent offenders. The objectives of the study 
were as follows: 
 
• to explore the heterogeneity of violence, examining common definitions as well as 
different types of violence; 
• to provide an overview of the current and developing knowledge and expertise, 
nationally and internationally, on assessing risk of violence, and to examine 
critically the advantages and limitations of these, including their applicability to 
populations other than adult males; 
• to examine practice, including the use of tools, processes and strategies, for the 
assessment of risk of violence, and to assess critically the advantages and 
limitations of such practice; 
• to assess current and imminent promising approaches to the assessment of risk of 
violence, including approaches for the initial screening of offenders and the use of 
acute dynamic risk factors as early warning signs of critical risk of violence; and 
• to provide recommendations for a risk assessment framework applicable for use by 
a range of disciplines and agencies involved in the management of violent 
offenders, and proposing tools or guidelines for use at various levels of 
assessment. 
 
METHODS 
 
2.3 The research was conducted between August and November 2007, in three main 
phases: Phase I - interviews with policy makers; Phase II – an international literature 
review; and Phase III – interviews with practitioners/managers. Phases I and III 
comprised 24 interviews with the following key agencies: 
 
• 7 mental health/forensic psychology staff; 
• 6 social work staff; 
• 5 senior policy makers (Scottish Government and CJA); 
• 3 senior police officers; 
• 2 Scottish Prison Service/Parole Board staff; 
• 1 victim agency. 
 
2.4 The first phase of the work involved exploratory discussions with 12 key policy 
personnel in the above agencies, exploring the over-arching issues currently being 
debated about risk of violence assessment within Scotland. The interview schedule for 
Phase I (see Appendix 1) was developed following discussions with the RMA and was 
piloted on the first two respondents after which minor amendments were made. The 
following departments/areas of expertise were covered: the Scottish Government, 
Scottish Prison Service, Criminal Justice Social Work, the Police, the Mental Welfare 
Commission, Forensic Mental Health, Victim Support Scotland and the Parole Board. 
These interviews covered the following areas: 
 
• the current state of play in relation to risk of violence assessment procedures 
across the various agencies in Scotland; 
• definitions of risk, violence and harm; 
• the strengths and limitations of MAPPAs, current and proposed legislation, and 
existing risk assessment tools; and 
• the key issues across agencies. 
 
2.5 Throughout the fieldwork period, a literature review (Phase II) informed the interviews 
and the development of the framework based on issues and experiences 
internationally. This review examined information on relevant legislation, policy, 
practice and research in relation to risk of violence, including inter-agency cooperation 
and the feasibility of assessment frameworks. The review focused on the last 5 - 10 
years and covered legal, policy and practice documents as well as academic research 
reports, books and journal articles. Source material included literature already known 
to the authors, supplemented by internet searches using search engines such as 
Google and Ingenta. A CD-ROM for training in risk assessment concurrently in 
development by Kemshall and colleagues (forthcoming) was a valuable source of such 
literature, as the disc contained a comprehensive collection of articles and reports 
relevant to risk assessment. The international element of the literature review focused 
predominantly on English-speaking countries (namely, the USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand) except where English versions of pertinent literature were available from 
other countries. The main topics which emerged from the review as the work 
progressed were as follows: 
 
• definitions and cultures of risk generally and risk of violence in particular; 
• the effectiveness of approaches to risk of violence assessment; 
• a comparison of mental health versus criminal justice legislation, policy, practice 
and research; 
• throughcare arrangements; 
• issues of user and family involvement in risk assessment; 
• organisational culture, performance indicators and accountability frameworks; and 
• target populations for assessment. 
 
2.6 Problems in risk assessment and risk management emerged as important issues, as 
did multi-agency working and training.  The literature is therefore explored under four 
headings in Chapter 3 – approaches to violence risk assessment, problems in risk 
assessment, risk management and throughcare, and multi-agency working, 
organisational issues and training. 
 
2.7 Originally, the literature review also intended to include an examination of risk 
assessment tools, their use across agencies, and how they accommodate diversity 
(e.g. gender, ethnicity, age or types of violence). The use and value of specific risk 
assessment tools was, however, already being addressed in the concurrent research 
for the RMA being carried out by Farrington and colleagues, and a separate 
investigation of tools in this review was thus deemed unnecessary. 
 2.8 Phase III comprised 12 further in-depth interviews with practitioners/managers across 
Social Work (criminal justice and adult services), Forensic Mental Health, the Police, 
the Parole Board, MAPPA coordinators and the Scottish Prison Service and followed 
up on the themes emerging from Phase I. The Phase III interview schedule (see 
Appendix 2) focused more on practice than on policy, within the following areas: 
 
• definitions and rankings of risk, violence and harm; 
• risk assessment procedures and objectives; 
• perceptions of certain risk assessment tools; 
• quality assurance and accountability; 
• inter-agency cooperation; 
• the strengths and weaknesses of MAPPAs; and 
• the key issues across agencies. 
 
2.9 Analysis of the qualitative data was undertaken manually, grouping the data under 
particular themes, based on the interview schedule. Also, in order to observe how the 
agencies worked together on specific cases, two of the research team sat in on a 
MAPPA Level 2 meeting in one particular area and one member of the team also 
attended a Parole Board meeting, in both instances to observe how agencies worked 
together on specific cases. Observations from these meetings have been incorporated, 
where appropriate, within the findings chapters. 
 
2.10 This study was necessarily limited in scope, given budgetary and time constraints, but 
provides an overview of existing arrangements and research in relation to risk of 
violence assessment across the relevant criminal justice agencies. One CJA, 5 local 
authority social work departments, 2 health boards and one police force were 
represented, comprising 16 respondents overall. The remaining 8 respondents came 
from the Scottish Government, prisons, parole and victims’ agencies. Because of the 
small sample size for the qualitative interviews, it has not been possible to 
systematically proportion views across agencies or skills levels of their staff. Equally, 
the views presented in this report have had to remain largely anonymised to protect the 
identity of the 24 respondents – mainly drawn from senior management – and cannot 
be said to be representative of those agencies’ views overall, not least the views of 
staff at a practitioner level. 
 
  
SUMMARY 
 
2.11 This research aimed to evaluate current and developing research, policy and practice 
both within the UK and internationally, in order to inform a possible framework for 
assessing risk of violence, not only within MAPPA but also across the board within 
criminal justice agencies. The study utilised two main methods: a literature review and 
qualitative interviews with key personnel in all the relevant agencies, including SPS, 
the Police, Social Work, victim agencies and Mental Health. These interviews explored 
differing definitions of risk of violence, current and potential policy and practice in 
assessing risk of violence, the strengths and limitations of MAPPA, organisational 
issues (including multi-agency working), and the key issues for agencies in assessing 
violence risk. The literature review explored similar themes to both complement and 
inform the qualitative data. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3. 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE 
 
3.1 A review of the literature informed the research throughout, covering topics such as 
definitions; approaches to risk assessment of violent offenders and problems with 
these; risk management and throughcare; and multi-agency working, training and 
organisational issues. Each of these will be addressed in turn. 
 
DEFINITIONS AND CULTURES OF RISK 
 
3.2 Specific definitions of risk are not universal: though they contain similar themes, no 
single agreed definition of concepts such as risk or violence is evident in the literature. 
Kumar and Simpson (2005) identified three key concepts in the literature that define 
risk, namely uncertainty, weighing up the likelihood of different outcomes, and the likely 
benefits as well as harm due to risk assessment. In Scotland, Barry (2007) defines 
concepts such as risk, risk factors, risk management, and risk assessment in some 
detail. She notes that the Risk Management Authority (RMA), which oversees risk in 
criminal justice in Scotland, defines risk as “[the] nature, likelihood, frequency, duration, 
seriousness and imminence of an offence” (2006: 50), and that a definition of the level 
of risk requires a structured consideration of each of those aspects. (ibid, 27).  
 
3.3 In England and Wales, Prison Service Order 2750 on Violence Reduction defines 
violence as “any incident in which a person is abused, threatened, or assaulted”. This 
includes an explicit or implicit challenge to their safety, well-being or health. The 
resulting harm may be physical, emotional or psychological” (para 9.1). Such a 
definition, according to the Order, offers a common agreed threshold of tolerance 
within the Service in order to give staff the confidence to challenge behaviour that falls 
within the definition. 
 
3.4 Risk assessment, in turn, is “the process of evaluating individuals to characterise the 
likelihood they will commit acts of violence” (MacLean Committee, Scottish Executive, 
2000). The MacLean Committee viewed risk assessment as an ongoing process 
requiring constant review and modification, including an account of both psychological 
and situational factors and a focus on public safety (Barry, 2007). For the present 
review, concerns about definitions focus more on risk generally, including risk of 
reoffending, as well as risk of violence and risk of harm in particular.  
 
3.5 Risk assessments and tools label various levels of risk with no agreed definition of 
what these levels mean in practice. The Cosgrove Report (2001) recommended that 
the Scottish Executive provide guidance regarding what constitutes high, medium and 
low risk. Some attempts have been made to clarify this. For example, the OASys 
assessment (Offender Assessment System, developed jointly by the Prison and 
Probation Services in England and Wales) defines low, medium, high, and very high 
risk (National Probation Service, 2005c and 2006b), as does the (identical) guidance 
for MAPPA in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2007b). Even so, no national profile of 
offenders registered as Level 3 (the highest level of supervision and perceived risk) 
under MAPPA has been issued, even where this system has been in place for several 
years (Wood, 2006).  
 
3.6 Barry expresses concern about the lack of consistency in definitions of risk levels 
across agencies and fields, especially in the criminal justice field. Wong and Gordon 
(2006 and 2007) deliberately avoid the use of labels of high, medium and low risk 
because of the concern that these labels obscure important distinctions. The Child 
Protection Audit and Review (2002) in Scotland gave an example of this difficulty in 
their discussion of an offender who committed a sexual murder – not a high frequency 
offence, but clearly one with a high level of harm. The Review consequently 
commented that a ‘high risk of reoffending’ fails to categorise the degree of potential 
harm or to identify potentially dangerous offenders. 
 
3.7 Definitions of who violent offenders are, let alone what violence actually is, can pose 
problems for risk assessment and management. The Scottish Government (2007b) 
defines violent offenders as those convicted on indictment of an offence inferring 
personal violence who are subject to a probation order, or who are or will be on release 
from prison, subject to statutory supervision in the community. However, no clear 
distinction exists between sexual and violent offenders (Loucks, 2002), for example, so 
differential application of specific legislation (such as separate streams for MAPPA) for 
each may be problematic. Violent offences themselves vary widely. Definitions of 
violence therefore also vary based on perceived seriousness, resulting harm, and 
context, such as in the case of domestic violence (Gilchrist and Kebbell, 2004) or 
school violence (Augustyniak, 2005). Some statutes have attempted to create specific 
legislation for violent sexual offenders, e.g., the 1990 Washington State sexual 
predator statute (Connelly and Williamson 2000), but again these offenders will not 
always be clearly identifiable from others. In such cases a trial may be held to 
determine whether an offender qualifies as a sexually violent predator (Lieb, 1996; Lieb 
and Matson, 1998). Sexual Predator Statutes typically apply to offenders who have at 
least one conviction for a sexually violent offence and are due to be released from 
custody upon completion of a sentence. Although often committed to psychiatric 
hospitals, the law pays little attention to the treatment needs of these individuals or 
whether psychiatrists believe they are treatable (American Psychiatric Association, 
1999). 
 
‘Dangerous’ offenders 
 
3.8 Brody and Tarling (1980) question the definitions of dangerous and what constitutes a 
‘dangerous’ offender. They comment that “… when it comes to classifying offenders, it 
is no simple matter to say who is dangerous or who not, and neither legal or other 
definitions, nor what research has already been done, can help very much” (p31). Over 
a quarter of a century later, this definition remains subjective and intuitive. Wood 
(2006) examines the long-term difficulty in conceptualising ‘dangerousness’, noting that 
“As the preoccupation with risk has continued, so too has the desire to distinguish the 
risky from the very risky, with the notion of dangerousness being inextricably linked to 
perceptions of very high risk and offenders being labelled as dangerous accordingly” 
(p309).  
 
3.9 Unfortunately much current legislation relies on the ability of assessors to determine 
who is dangerous. In Australia, a judge must be “satisfied by acceptable evidence that 
the convicted person is... so likely to commit further crimes of violence, though the 
standard of proof required for this was not clarified (Campbell, 1991: pp86-7). In the 
United States, the Supreme Court decided in Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) that civil 
detention after the completion of a sentence was legitimate if offenders were deemed 
“unable to control” their dangerousness. The Court did not, however, define what this 
was. Mercado and colleagues (2006) therefore questioned what factors were important 
to assessors in determining the ability of sexually violent offenders to control their 
behaviour. They found that verbalisation of control, history of sexual violence, and the 
context of the legal hearing were highly relevant to this, but also that most participants 
made remarkably high estimates of likelihood of future sexual violence. Fears of and 
potential for violence are likely to coincide with high assessments of risk (Rosenfeld 
and Lewis, 2005) 
 
3.10 Edens and colleagues (2005) examined how expert testimony can define whether 
someone poses a ‘continuing threat to society’. They found that such predictions often 
grossly overestimated risk and that, despite advances in the field of risk assessment, 
clinical assessments of the risk of future violence appear to be “highly inaccurate and 
ethically questionable at best” (p55). Similarly, Corbett and Westwood (2005) query the 
definitions used in psychiatric diagnoses of ‘dangerous and severe personality 
disorder' (‘DSPD'), arguing that concepts such as ‘dangerousness', ‘violence' and ‘risk' 
were subjective, with socio-political rather than psychiatric rationales for justifying 
psychiatric detention. Rogers and Lynett (1991; also Wettstein, 1992; Reardon, 1992) 
agree, contending that estimates of future dangerousness are based on concepts that 
are not legally defined and have no basis in psychiatry.  
 
3.11 Bonta and colleagues (1996; also Brody and Tarling, 1980) note that psychiatric 
diagnoses are prominent in the designation of offenders as ‘dangerous’. Almost three-
quarters of offenders with this designation in Canada had been diagnosed with 
antisocial personality disorder, while 40% could be diagnosed as psychopathic. The 
designation of ‘dangerous offender’ in Canada still predominately applies to sex 
offenders, despite reforms of dangerous offender provisions to alter this (Grant, 1998; 
Connelly and Williamson, 2000).  
 
3.12 The National Probation Service in England and Wales (2005b) explains that offenders 
who have previously been convicted of a specified offence are assumed to be 
dangerous unless to presume so would be unreasonable. ‘Significant risk’ depends 
upon whether the commission of further such offences exposes members of the public 
to serious harm. The term ‘dangerous’ under the terms of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
in England and Wales therefore applies to offenders whom the court judges to present 
such a risk (ibid). The Probation Service goes on to clarify that ‘significant risk’ is for 
the court to assess in each case. ‘Serious harm’, however, is defined as ‘death or 
serious personal injury whether that is physical or psychological’. This differs from the 
definition of risk of serious harm in OASys, which defines it as ‘a risk which is life 
threatening and/or traumatic and from which recovery, whether physical or 
psychological, can be expected to be difficult or impossible’.2   The two definitions are, 
however, arguably comparable (National Probation Service, 2005b). 
                                                 
 
 3.13 Connelly and Williamson (2000) outline a range of definitions and criteria for dangerous 
offenders in various countries. Many criteria for ‘dangerous’ offenders are based on 
offence categories. Many also specify the role of judicial discretion, such as in New 
Zealand where the sentencing judge may impose preventative detention where he or 
she is satisfied that this is necessary for public protection (Birgden, 2007; Meek, 1995; 
New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 1997; Brown, 1996; also Petrunik, 2002 for a review 
of the US and Canada, and Ray and Craze, 1991 for provisions in Denmark). Under 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 in England and Wales, indeterminate or extended 
sentences for public protection must be imposed for sexual or violent offenders if the 
court assesses them as posing a significant risk to the public.  
 
3.14 Connelly and Williamson (2000) note a trend in many countries towards implementing 
provisions that are specifically geared towards public safety but equally that 
evaluations of their effectiveness are sparse. Earlier research by Brown (1996) found 
that offenders classified as ‘serious’ under the legislation for preventative detention in 
New Zealand were significantly less likely than ‘ordinary’ offenders to be re-imprisoned 
within two and a half years of release: the vast majority (92%) of subsequent ‘serious 
offences’ were committed by offenders originally imprisoned for ‘ordinary’ offences. 
The legislation therefore failed to define and detain offenders who presented the 
greatest threat to public safety. Although this information is now somewhat dated, the 
figures starkly illustrate the fact that such legislation fails to prevent the vast bulk of 
serious offending (also Petrunik, 2002). The costs of such policies compared to their 
impact on serious offending are also disproportionately high (Petrunik, 2002). 
 
3.15 In the Netherlands, the vast majority (90%) of offenders categorised under their 
legislation for the management of dangerous offenders were serious violent offenders 
(Kinzig, 1997). This makes an interesting contrast to other countries such as the UK, 
which appear to define a higher proportion of sexual offenders as ‘dangerous’. 
Dangerous offender legislation in Germany bases its definitions on repetitive offending 
and risk of harm and consequently includes psychological harm and damage to 
property as well as physical harm (Kinzig, 1997; Albrecht, 1997). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 The definition of serious harm under MASRAM in Northern Ireland replaces ‘impossible’ with ‘incomplete’ 
(Owens, 2003). 
3.16 Grant (1998) expresses concern that a focus on ‘dangerous’ offenders ignores more 
frequent forms of violence and diverts attention away from preventing these. Attention 
to violence from strangers, which Grant notes is characteristic of legislation on 
dangerous offenders, fails to take into account the fact that victims of violent and 
sexual offences usually know the perpetrator. Specifically, it ignores domestic violence 
and sexual abuse on the basis that such offending does not put the general public at 
risk.  
 
3.17 The approach in Scotland since the work of the McLean Committee has been to use 
the term ‘risk’ rather than ‘dangerousness’: 
 
… because the term dangerousness implies a dispositional trait, inherent in 
an individual, that compels him/her to engage in a range of violent behaviour 
across a range of settings. That approach fails to take into account the 
complex interaction of psychological characteristics and situational factors in 
the production of violent acts. (2000: 2.4) 
 
Further, the Committee preferred to focus on risk assessment, which they viewed not 
as an end in itself but as a link to “positive action to manage and reduce risk” (ibid, 
2.3). 
 
3.18 Despite the problems evident in the literature, guidance regarding definitions of violent 
offences and offenders can be helpful as long as it recognises the need to take into 
account the characteristics of individual cases. The next section examines ways to 
approach such assessments. 
 
APPROACHES TO VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT 
Characteristics of violent offenders 
 
3.19 Research on violent offenders often identifies characteristics that seem to set such 
offenders apart from others. Stalans and colleagues (2004) found that the strongest 
predictor of violent recidivism was whether the offender was a generalised aggressor 
(meaning people who are violent in a variety of contexts including both in and out of 
the home). Hanson and Harris (2000) found poor social supports, antisocial lifestyle, 
and poor self-management strategies to be important risk factors for violent 
reoffending, as were lack of co-operation with supervision and hostile attitudes.  
 
3.20 Some sex differences in predictions of violence are evident. The vast majority of 
serious violent offenders are male (Loucks, 2002). Henning and Feder (2004) found 
that female arrestees for domestic violence were significantly less likely than males to 
have histories that indicate potential for future violence. Teasdale and colleagues 
(2006; also Robbins et al, 2003) noted contextual differences in violence from male 
and female psychiatric patients.  
 
3.21 Equally evident in the literature is the recognition that violent offenders are not a 
homogenous group that can easily be set apart or distinguished from others. Loucks 
(2002) noted that characteristics of serious violent offenders are more similar to 
offenders generally - even those who have never committed a violent offence - than to 
non-offenders, and that recidivism is not usually for further violence. Indeed, violent 
offenders tend to be generalist rather than specialist offenders: a large proportion 
commit other types of offences, both before and after their first conviction for violence 
(Grunfeld and Noreik, 1986). Brody and Tarling (1980) found, for example, that 
violence is almost always mixed with property crimes.  
 
3.22 The rate of violent offending has been found to be a good predictor of future offending, 
though not necessarily of violence (Loucks, 2002). In saying this, those who had 
committed a violent offence in the past were more likely to do so again (also Stalans et 
al, 2004), and early antisocial behaviour was amongst the top-ranked predictors of 
future violent offending. Greater recidivism was also associated with more extensive 
offending histories and with more serious offences (Loucks, 2002). Brody and Tarling 
(1980) note that, with prisoners who had been labelled as ‘dangerous’, violent 
episodes were more regular and frequent than for other violent offenders, though not 
necessarily more serious. Early research shows the tendency towards further violence 
increases with each recurring violent incident, occasionally with emergence of a 
‘violent type’ (Walker et al, 1967; Phillpotts and Lancucki, 1979). 
 
3.23 Some evidence suggests that better prediction is possible when ‘serious’ violence is 
separated from more trivial incidents (Kozol et al, 1972), though such separation is far 
from straightforward (Brody and Tarling, 1980). Much of the research suggests that a 
relatively small group of offenders commit the majority of crimes which involve serious 
violence against others (see Piper 1985). Brody and Tarling (1980) found that 
prisoners whom staff had identified as ‘dangerous’ generally reoffended less on 
release than others but that they also accounted for a disproportionate number of 
subsequent convictions for violence. Brody and Tarling assert that this provides good 
evidence in favour of careful and detailed consideration of individual cases in 
discussions of dangerousness. 
 
3.24 Loucks (2002) notes that serious violent offenders start offending earlier and are more 
likely to continue offending into adulthood than are other offenders. Again, sexual and 
violent offenders are not necessarily distinct groups: previous convictions for violence, 
especially numerous and highly violent offences, indicated high risk of reoffending for 
sexual offences. Equally, recidivism amongst sexual aggressors tends to be for the 
same type of offence (ibid; Miller et al, 2005). 
 
3.25 Violent offenders remain a diverse population even within specific types of violent 
offences. Gilchrist and colleagues (2003), for example, found no consistent type of 
domestic violence or perpetrator, though they were able to identify risk factors for 
domestic violence (also Cunningham et al, 1998). Dutton (1998) identified 
psychopathology in the form of borderline personality disorder as a characteristic of 
some perpetrators of domestic violence, though most general violent offenders show 
no evidence of mental illness (Loucks, 2002).  
 
Methods of assessment 
 
3.26 Methods of assessing risk have been under discussion for decades (Barry, 2007). The 
tendency in recent years has been to favour actuarial methods over clinical 
assessment (i.e., Andrews, 2007), while authors such as Murphy (2004) note the 
importance and accuracy of the ‘gut feelings’ and clinical judgment of the Community 
Mental Health Nurses in assessments for violence. Still others assert that, for certain 
populations, neither method is superior to the other (McMillan et al, 2004).  
 
3.27 A review for the Scottish Executive by Kemshall (2001 and 2002) notes that clinical 
methods of risk assessment are considered less reliable than actuarial methods (also 
Petrunik, 2002). They can however provide important information on individual risky 
behaviours, environmental stressors, and in establishing treatability and management 
plans. Kemshall asserts that combining clinical and actuarial methods in a holistic 
approach to risk assessment is now advocated as a technique most likely to enhance 
both the predictive accuracy and usefulness of risk assessments of dangerous 
offenders. Current methods of assessment rely on structured clinical assessment, 
which combines actuarial tools with clinical judgment to yield both an assessment of 
risk and ideally to inform case management plans. Wood (2006) notes that 
professional judgment is crucial to risk assessment and management, but that this 
judgment must have a solid evidence base to underpin it if it is to lead to defensible 
decision making. 
 
3.28 In England and Wales, OASys gives an example of this combined approach (National 
Probation Service, 2005c). OASys is structured to help practitioners assess how likely 
an offender is to reoffend and the likely seriousness of any offence they are likely to 
commit, including the risk of harm offenders pose to themselves and others. It identifies 
and classifies offending-related needs, such as accommodation and poor literacy, 
since tackling these specific needs reduces the probability of reoffending. OASys also 
helps to produce sentence plans and pre-sentence reports of a high standard. OASys 
does not replace an assessor’s judgement but helps to ensure that the assessment is 
comprehensive and evidence based. This approach is similar to the Level of Service 
Case Management Inventory, or LS/CMI, which is planned for use across Scotland in 
the near future. 
 
3.29 A further debate is around the use of static versus dynamic factors for risk assessment. 
Philipse and colleagues (2006) in the Netherlands found that a small set of static 
predictors yielded a good estimate of future reconvictions, whilst dynamic predictors 
did not add predictive power (Philipse et al, 2006). In contrast, research in the UK 
(Lindsay et al, 2004; Thornton, 2002) identified a number of dynamic variables as 
being possible predictors of future violence. The Child Protection Audit and Review 
(2002) in Scotland noted the importance of including detailed information on both 
family history and dynamics. Wood (2006: 318) goes so far as to say that: “Whilst static 
risk factors are clearly of relevance, it is the dynamic factors that are crucial to 
considerations of risk.” 
 
3.30 More basic research methodologies have also shown value. For violent offenders, self-
reports of their behaviour appear to be fairly accurate. Kroner and colleagues (2006) 
found that socially desirable responding (SDR - responding in ways which subjects 
believed may be more socially and culturally acceptable) did not reduce the predictive 
validity of self-reported violence. This is consistent with the statements in the 
interviews conducted in this study (see Chapter 4) in which practitioners said offenders 
discussed violence very openly and that perceived stigma against violent behaviour 
was either weak or non-existent. 
 
Tools for assessment 
 
3.31 A number of tools for assessment of risk of violence have been developed. In Scotland, 
tools which are likely to be of most use to staff engaged in high-risk work include the 
Violence Risk Assessment Guide (VRAG) and the Historical, Clinical and Risk 
Management Assessment Scheme (HCR-20). Kemshall (2001 and 2002) reports that 
the VRAG actuarial assessment is the most accurate and the most widely used 
throughout the UK, while the separate structured clinical assessment in HCR-20 
provides value in terms of identifying those dynamic factors requiring case intervention 
and treatment. The HCR-20 is designed for risk management, while the VRAG focuses 
more on the probability of further risk behaviour. Other commonly used tools for 
assessment in this field are the Level of Service Inventory - Revised (LSI-R), which the 
LS/CMI will update, and the Psychopathy Checklist, Revised (PCL-R). Farrington and 
colleagues (2007) focus on these tools in their review for the Risk Management 
Authority (RMA). The RMA also compares a number of commonly used risk 
assessment tools in its Evaluation Directory, RATED (RMA, 2007). 
 
3.32 The HCR-20 is commonly used as an assessment tool in many countries, particularly in 
forensic settings. Research in the Netherlands (De Vogel and De Ruiter, 2006) found 
that the predictive validity for violence of the HCR-20 was good amongst male mentally 
disordered offenders admitted to a forensic psychiatric hospital. Research in Norway 
(Hartvig et al, 2006) found that the PS (Preliminary Scheme), a 33-item scale based on 
the HCR-20, showed a definite association between scores on the scale and violence 
following discharge from an acute psychiatric inpatient unit. Other tools that have found 
support for the assessment of violent offenders include CARDS (Watts et al, 2004); 
use of a Classification and Regression Tree (CART; Rosenfeld and Lewis, 2005) or 
Classification Tree Analysis (CTA; Stalans et al, 2004); the Violence Risk Screening 
Instrument (VRSI; Davies and Dedel, 2006); the Violence Risk Scale (VRS; Wong and 
Gordon, 2006 and 2007); the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory (BDHI; Firestone et al, 
2005); the Dynamic Risk Assessment and Management System (DRAMS; Lindsay et 
al, 2004); and the Brøset-Violence-Checklist (BVC; Abderhaldern et al, 2004). 
 
3.33 Davies and Dedel (2006) note that community correctional settings require a separate 
mechanism for risk assessment that can both classify offenders according to their risk 
of violent recidivism and be administered quickly and effectively by non-clinicians. 
Equally, some authors highlight the importance of developing and validating models for 
problematic or unique subgroups of individuals such as stalkers (Rosenfeld and Lewis, 
2005) or perpetrators of domestic violence (Heckert and Gondolf, 2005)3. Different 
approaches to assessment for such offences have proved useful, such as the use of 
assessments of risk of future victimisation by female victims of domestic violence 
(Cattaneo et al, 2007). Some authors have advocated assessment of risk of 
victimisation for all women and children who have been victims of domestic violence as 
a means of identifying future offences (Hester and Westmarland 2005) 
 
3.34 Equally some authors assert that single methods of assessment can work for a range 
of types of violence (Bonta, 2007). Dunbar and colleagues (2005) examined the 
specific issue of hate crimes (i.e., racially motivated offending). They found that ratings 
of risk using the HCR-20 were comparable to those found amongst other groups of 
offenders and were correlated with the severity of the hate crime. The severity of the 
criminal history as measured on the Cormier-Lang scale, the number of prior arrests, 
and number of criminal convictions were significantly greater for offenders who 
targeted racial minority victims. Offenders who belonged to bias-orientated groups had 
more extensive and violent criminal histories and committed more severe hate crimes. 
 
PROBLEMS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 
Definition and purpose 
 
3.35 McIvor and Kemshall (2002) suggest that a primary consideration in approaches to risk 
assessment is the ability for professional groups to make defensible decisions 
supported by appropriate tools. Not all tools helped this process in the same way or 
equally effectively, with weaknesses including their complexity, lack of objectivity, lack 
of validation and, for violent offenders, inability to measure the specific risks associated 
with violence. The authors found that tools for risk assessment had most often been 
adopted based on the ease with which they could be administered and/or scored, their 
ability to identify risk of harm, and their ability to identify the risk of sexual offending.  
 
                                                 
3 Indeed, such tools have been developed, such as the Stalking Assessment and Management (SAM; Kropp et 
al, 2006), the Spousal Assault Risk Assessment (SARA; Kropp et al, 1995), and the Brief Spousal Assault Form 
for the Evaluation of Risk (B-Safer; Kropp et al, 2005). 
3.36 Some risk assessment tools (e.g., HRC-20 and VRAG) have shown improved rates of 
prediction of violent offences (Kemshall 2001 and 2002), but risk factors for serious 
offenders are largely similar to those for other types of offenders. The prediction 
specifically of future violent offending is therefore more difficult (Loucks, 2002). 
 
3.37 An important issue in risk assessment is the tendency to resort to assessments for risk 
prediction rather than for risk management. Risk prediction involves an assessment 
that comes up with a ‘score’ of likely risk of reoffending in an attempt to ‘predict’ likely 
future behaviour. Hart and colleagues (2007) argue that this is technically impossible 
when applied to individuals and therefore sets itself up to fail. Risk prediction shows 
particular limitations regarding estimates of whether someone poses a ‘continuing 
threat to society’, even where structured risk assessments are used (Edens et al, 
2005). Indeed, Horsefield (2003: 374) comments that “if [the value risk assessment] 
was based only on accuracy in prediction of future events, it would have vanished 
years ago” (also Hart et al, 2007). Risk assessment for the purpose of management, 
on the other hand, is a more dynamic process that takes into account the need for an 
individualised and responsive risk management process and assists in its 
development. Risk assessment is only one part of a wider process of risk management 
(Cosgrove Report, 2001). The distinction may be a fine one, but it is important in terms 
of understanding the purpose of assessments of risk and in working towards the 
prevention of future offending. 
 
3.38 The need for comprehensive risk assessment and risk management intervention rather 
than merely prediction about the likelihood of reoffending (see also Kumar and 
Simpson, 2005) has been evident in practice in Scotland. The Child Protection Audit 
and Review (2002), for example, found that scores on assessments showing a low 
likelihood of (in this case) impulsive behaviour were not then compared with 
assessments showing a high risk of reoffending and other concerns, as well as 
documented recent behaviour. Langan and Lindow (2004) in England also gave 
examples of conflicting descriptions of behaviour and consequently of perceived risk. 
The Child Protection Audit and Review (2002) strongly emphasised the need to take 
into account all available information for risk assessment rather than individual test 
scores. Barry (2007) also highlighted this as a concern, finding that individual risk 
assessment tools were beginning to replace rather than inform professional judgement. 
 
3.39 The emphasis on mental disorder in some assessments of risk may be misleading and 
disproportionate. Van Der Merwe and Dawes (2007) found in their review of 
assessments of young people that a number of instruments designed to assess risk of 
violence amongst young people exist (e.g., SAVRY), but that many focus on identifying 
psychopathic tendencies in young people rather than violence per se (e.g., PCL:YV – 
see below). 
 
Universal applicability 
 
3.40 Methods of risk assessment have been designed and validated almost entirely with 
populations of white adult men. The Risk Matrix 2000 scale for assessing risk of sexual 
and violent offending, for example, is designed for adults (Child Protection Audit and 
Review, 2002). The literature therefore regularly questions their use with, and 
applicability to, other populations such as women, ethnic minorities, young people, and 
people with intellectual impairments (Campbell et al, 2007; Odgers et al, 2005; Shaw 
and Hannah-Moffat, 2001; Rumgay, 1996; McMillan et al, 2004). 
 
3.41 Kemshall (2004) notes the need for risk assessment of women to take into account a 
range of contextual features that distinguish their offending from men’s. Skeem and 
colleagues (2005) found that mental health professionals of both sexes are particularly 
limited in their ability to assess female patients’ risk of future violence. Assessments of 
ethnic minorities can also be problematic (Desai, 2006).  
 
3.42 Långström and Grann (2002) reported that the PCL-R (Psychopathy Checklist – 
Revised) may be a less valid predictor for severe violent recidivism among young 
people than among adult offenders. Some tools have since been structured specifically 
for young people, such as a Youth Version of the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL:YV) and 
the Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY). Some assessments 
may work for women as well. For example, the LSI-R manual supplies normative data 
for both female and male offenders and the LS/CMI can equally be used for women 
(Andrews and Bonta, 1995; Bonta, 2007; Wong and Gordon, 2006 and 2007). 
 
3.43 While some risk assessment tools have been tested for applicability across cultures 
(see, for example, Abderhaldern et al, 2004), this is not always the case. Van Der 
Merwe and Dawes (2007), for example, note the lack of research on violence risk 
assessment in South Africa, particularly on the assessment of risk for violence in 
children and adolescents. 
 
3.44 A further concern is the applicability of risk assessments for different types of risk 
(Davies and Dedel, 2006). Assessment tools have been developed for different types of 
violent offenders to take differences in type of risk into account, but this makes 
comparability difficult and inhibits transferability of tools across offender populations 
(Kemshall, 2001 and 2002). Prediction of particularly rare offences poses further 
problems (Evans et al, 2005; Morrison, 2003; Monahan, 1981). Brody and Tarling 
(1980) note that the infrequency of very serious offences as well as their apparently 
random quality makes definition and assessment of a genuinely ‘dangerous type’ highly 
dubious, thereby casting doubt on policies that aim to reduce serious violence through 
selective use of extended periods of imprisonment. 
 
3.45 In cases where the rate of reconviction is low initially, such as for very serious violence 
or sexual offending, any apparent reduction in reoffending is too small to attribute to the 
effectiveness of treatment or management rather than chance (Falshaw et al, 2003). 
This issue of scarcity of certain behaviours is another argument regarding difficulty in 
conducting risk assessments for serious violence amongst women (Kemshall, 2004).  
 
Definitions of target groups 
 
3.46 As discussed previously, violence and violent offenders have been difficult to define in 
concrete terms. This is also the case for designations of offenders as ‘dangerous’ for the 
purpose of ‘dangerous offender’ legislation, with the result that relevant provisions have 
been applied inconsistently (i.e., Soward, 1998; Bonta et al, 1996). The National 
Probation Service in England and Wales (2005d) identified this as a problem during 
early analysis of risk of harm levels from OASys, where noticeable variation was evident 
between areas in how thresholds of risk are applied. Early discussion from Brody and 
Tarling (1980) raised the issue of difficulty in distinguishing between ‘violent’ offenders 
and others, due to the fact that most crimes of violence are relatively minor incidents 
that recur in the careers of many ‘ordinary’ offenders. 
 
3.47 Connelly and Williamson (2000) note difficulties in definitions of psychopathic disorder 
which, for the purpose of risk assessment, tend to be combined as a single disorder 
without acknowledging the wide variations within this diagnosis. Similarly, Ogloff (2006) 
explains that research shows that between 50% and 80% of prisoners meet the criteria 
for a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, yet only about 15% of prisoners would 
be expected to be psychopathic, based on the PCL-R. As such, the characteristics and 
research findings drawn from the research on psychopathy may not be relevant for 
those with antisocial or dissocial personality disorder. Huss and colleagues (2006) 
similarly note that antisocial or psychopathic characteristics are potentially problematic 
in the ongoing evaluation of risk but encourage clinicians to assess routinely for these 
traits. They also note that these characteristics demand special attention in cases of 
domestic violence and have a number of implications for treatment of this group. 
 
3.48 In Australia and New Zealand, Kumar and Simpson (2005) have widened the argument 
to question the extent to which violence risk assessment designed in forensic settings 
applies equally to general psychiatric settings (also Hartvig et al, 2006). In North 
America, Davies and Dedel (2006) apply a similar argument to the applicability of 
instruments such as the LSI-R, PCL-R-2, VRAG, and HCR-20 to predicting violence in 
community corrections. 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT AND THROUGHCARE 
 
3.49 The Child Protection Audit and Review in Scotland (2002) described risk assessment 
as being, at best, “an imprecise activity” (para 4.1), but equally one that is of no value 
without the support of a plan to manage and minimise that risk. The multiple 
dimensions of ‘risk’ make careful and detailed consideration of individual cases and 
offences especially important (Brody and Tarling, 1980). Belfrage and colleagues 
(2004) found that appropriate risk management can reduce the number of subsequent 
violent incidents even where subjects showed no significant decrease in important risk 
factors for violence.  
 
3.50 Where prisoners have been recalled to custody, the assumption is that, wherever 
possible, the Parole Board will re-release the prisoner as soon as it is safe and 
practical to do so. Risk management plans therefore play a critical part in determining 
when a prisoner is re-released (National Probation Service, 2005a). Re-release may 
not be practicable when, for example, prisoners are assessed as a high risk of 
committing violent or sexual offences or their behaviour has deteriorated to such an 
extent the Parole Board believes re-offending to be imminent. In such cases, an 
adequately robust plan for risk management may be difficult to construct (ibid), though 
in Scotland this was a primary aim of introducing the LS/CMI. 
 
User involvement 
 
3.51 Barry (2007) notes that the focus in criminal justice appears to be more on managing 
risk than on alleviating other problems that might influence offenders’ behaviour. The 
literature identifies a number of these factors as important in the ongoing management 
of risk of violence. Appropriate housing, for example, is identified as critical (Langan and 
Lindow, 2004; Child Protection Audit and Review, 2002; SWIA 2007; Scottish 
Government, 2007a). Other issues include the management of hostility and anger 
(Firestone et al, 2005) and full involvement of service users wherever possible, without 
limiting assessments solely to the offender’s account (Cosgrove Report, 2001; Barry, 
2007) and including a willingness to take appropriate risks, to talk about risk, and to look 
holistically at all aspects of a person's life (Langan and Lindow, 2004; Kumar and 
Simpson, 2005). Langan and Lindow (2004) found that community-based risk 
management is more likely to be successful when clients receive quick and effective 
responses to any difficulties – something which does not always happen in practice. 
 
3.52 Risk management provisions in Scotland apply primarily to sex offenders, though they 
will pertain to violent offenders in future once MAPPA procedures in Scotland are 
widened to include them. While the voluntary participation of clients in risk management 
is beneficial, Irving (2005) comments that the lack of any statutory back-up in Scotland 
requiring offenders to participate in the risk assessment process is flawed. Further, 
Barry (2007) notes that the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act (2003) allows for serious 
violent and sexual offenders to be subject to a Risk Assessment Order (RAO) but that 
offenders can challenge the findings of these and indeed may also commission their 
own additional risk assessments. 
  
Retribution v rehabilitation 
 
3.53 Retributive models of addressing risk fail to provide for the eventual likelihood that 
offenders will be released into the community (Lieb et al, 1998; Wilson, 1995), nor do 
they motivate treatment in offenders (Connelly and Williamson, 2000). The lack of a 
period of supervision prior to final release also reduces the ability of professionals to 
assess change in offenders’ behaviour, which may in turn delay the decision to release 
offenders from custody in the first place and err on the side of caution (Quinsey, 1992; 
Petrunik, 1994; Connelly and Williamson, 2000). 
 
3.54 ‘Dangerous offender’ legislation appears to have had a number of unintended effects 
on the treatment and management of offenders labelled under these statutes. Klotz and 
colleagues (1992), for example, questioned whether the possibility of extended 
detention would lead offenders to deny their offending and therefore to hesitate to seek 
treatment in custody. Connelly and Williamson (2000) explained that treatment 
programmes in prison tend to be targeted at those near the end of their sentence, but 
those sentenced to indefinite detention under dangerous offender legislation may have 
no specific release date. ‘Dangerous offenders’ may consequently be left in the system, 
unable to get treatment due to lack of a release date, but unable to get a release date 
due to lack of participation in treatment.  
 
3.55 This is also an issue for treatment and management in the community. Levenson 
(2003) found that dangerousness legislation, and public notification clauses in particular, 
decreased compliance with treatment (also Wood and Kemshall, 2007). Cohen and 
Jeglic (2007) questioned whether intensive and extended supervision in the community 
is targeted at offenders at highest risk of serious reoffending and indeed whether merely 
extending periods of supervision is useful. Sample and Bray (2006), for example, note 
that targeting sex offenders under such measures is useful, as (like violent offenders) 
they are not a homogeneous group and will have differing patterns of re-arrest and 
differing levels of risk. 
 
3.56 Petrunik (2002) neatly summarises the range of approaches to risk management, in 
this case relating to sex offenders but arguably equally applicable to violent or other 
serious offenders. He cites these as: 
• Clinical approaches, in which clinical experts claim offenders can be managed and 
‘healed’ through treatment 
• Justice approaches, which advocate the right of all individuals not to have their 
liberties restricted without just cause or full protections 
• Community protection–risk management approaches, in which offenders are 
identified and isolated from the community or placed under supervision; and 
• Community reintegration approaches, which favour reintegrative and restorative 
measures, placing accountability on both the offender and the community staff or 
volunteers to minimise the risk of reoffending 
 
Connelly and Williamson (2000) indicate that the legislation in many jurisdictions (including 
England and Wales) now incorporates both retributive and rehabilitative approaches, or 
‘hybrid’ policies, for dealing with ‘dangerous’ offenders. Petrunik (2002) suggests that 
community reintegration approaches such as Circles of Support show the most promise for 
risk management. 
 
The need for information 
 
3.57 The literature repeats the need for full and independent information for proper 
assessment and management of risk with violent offenders. Information about an 
offence may be relevant even where an offence is not primarily a violent one. The Child 
Protection Audit and Review (2002), for example, mentioned the need for a marker 
(Crime Type Indicator) on criminal records which highlights whether an offence involved 
a sexual or violent element. The Cosgrove Report (2001) in Scotland recommended a 
similar system of ‘flagging’ the existence of (in this case) a sexual element in any charge 
which is not itself a sexual offence (e.g., breach of the peace). A similar approach could 
be used for violent behaviour. In England and Wales, the Police National Computer 
(PNC) has proved more effective than databases such as the Offender Index at 
identifying relevant convictions, though access to information on the PNC is more 
restricted (Falshaw et al, 2003). 
 
3.58 The Cosgrove Report (2001) recommended the development of a national protocol 
determining the information which must be exchanged upon release. The Cosgrove 
Committee believed that community-based social workers responsible for supervising 
offenders upon release should have detailed information about an offender’s behaviour 
in prison as well as response to and the impact of any prison-based programmes. While 
their recommendations were directed at sex offenders, a similar model for violent 
offenders is likely to be of importance in risk management. 
 
3.59 The National Probation Service in England and Wales (2005a) cites a range of 
information relevant to risk management. This can include progress on offending 
behaviour programmes; accommodation status and changes in this; and any 
outstanding charges: specifically, “what action can reduce the risk of what event 
happening, to whom, and how it will work?” (ibid, App A, p3). This includes 
consideration of the likelihood of compliance with licence conditions and supervision; 
management arrangements including accommodation and employment opportunities; 
and actions in the event that any parts of the plan cannot immediately be put in place. 
 
Effective approaches to management 
 
3.60 Very few systematic evaluations of treatment programmes for violent offenders have 
been conducted. The heterogeneity of violent offences and offenders entering these 
programmes further hinders assessments of their impact (Kemshall, 2001; 2002). 
Kemshall (2002) notes that cognitive-behavioural methods of treatment show the most 
promise, though some offenders are less amenable to treatment. Programme integrity 
and the accurate targeting of high-risk offenders are also key features of effective 
treatment, as is the offender’s motivation to change and timing of treatment (ibid). The 
Cosgrove Report (2001) recommended the development of an integrated, consistent, 
and dynamic approach to programme delivery for offenders which builds on existing 
plans and expertise. 
 
3.61 Andrews and colleagues (2005) advocate risk-need-responsivity (RNR) – basically the 
need to match offenders with appropriate rehabilitative programmes (Horsefield, 2003; 
Maguire and Raynor, 2006), which they argue provides a valid knowledge base to 
underpin risk management with the result of enhanced public protection. In England and 
Wales, the Prison Service has introduced an intranet Violence Reduction Toolkit to 
assist in the management of violent offenders in custody (HM Prison Service, 2004). 
Restorative justice practices following violent offences have also shown promise in a 
number of countries, including claims of reduced recidivism and reduced trauma for 
victims (Sherman and Strang, 2007). Factors to consider in the management of any 
offender are his or her internal and external strengths, or inhibitors to reoffending 
(Owens, 2003). 
 
3.62 Treatment programmes are only part of the wider management of violent offender risk. 
Intensive support mechanisms in the community enhance the management of risk 
beyond custody. Kemshall (2002) argues that treatment should be part of broader risk 
management strategies to ensure monitoring, surveillance, and appropriate action to 
enforce any conditions imposed and to challenge inappropriate behaviours. 
Programmes designed to reduce recidivism can target specific risk factors for change 
(Andrews et al, 1995). Further, an extended range or ‘menu’ of effective interventions 
can be useful as part of an integrated strategy to reduce offending (Goldblatt and Lewis, 
1998). 
 
3.63 Offenders who have been referred to MAPPA in Scotland progress through it in three 
key stages. These are identification as falling within the criteria for MAPPA and 
notification to the relevant MAPPA coordinator; referral to Level 2 or 3 if necessary 
based on assessed risk of harm; and eventual deregistration, determined for violent 
offenders convicted on indictment by the period of supervision under licence or for other 
offenders by assessment from the Responsible Authority that they no longer pose a risk 
of serious harm (Scottish Government, 2007b). Exit from MAPPA for Category 3 
(‘other’) offenders therefore appears highly discretionary, despite clear criteria in the 
legislation for offenders to enter and leave the process in other cases4. 
 
3.64 Kemshall and colleagues (2005) reviewed MAPPA processes in England and Wales 
and identified a number of factors that contributed to effective risk management. The 
first of these was the presence of a dedicated MAPPA coordinator, which provided a 
greater level of consistency, quality assurance, and a stronger link between operational 
and strategic work in local MAPP arrangements. The most effective panel meetings had 
competent and proactive Chairs; standing agendas in line with the MAPPA guidance; 
active input from all who attended; and practice standards for the conduct of meetings 
(ibid).  
 
3.65 Kemshall and colleagues explained that areas that were successful in managing risk 
levels adopted a broad range of approaches including a clear definition of active Level 2 
involvement, the downgrading of cases where appropriate, and recognition that level of 
referral depends on the extent of multi-agency work needed to manage the offender as 
well as the level of risk. Proactive exchange of information greatly aided risk 
management planning, as did the systematic review of risk factors, clear actions and 
timescales, and contingency plans (ibid). Finally, the Scottish Executive Justice 
Department (2006) highlighted the crucial role, based on experience in England and 
Wales, of MAPPA coordinators in engaging with the responsible authorities and with 
agencies that have a duty to cooperate as well as ‘gatekeeping’ to ensure cases 
referred meet the MAPPA criteria.  
 
3.66 Even where MAPPA procedures were working well, allocation of offenders to the 
respective levels still tended to err on the side of caution, with a higher than necessary 
                                                 
 
4 This level of discretion in the management of offenders is similar to the MASRAM process for sex offenders in 
Northern Ireland, where specific provisions for entrance to and exit from MASRAM procedures do not exist 
(Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, 2005). 
proportion of offenders allocated to the highest level of management. This in turn results 
in resources being diverted from those who genuinely pose a high risk (Kemshall et al, 
2005). Further, offenders with mental health problems or learning disabilities in MAPPA 
may require additional provision of supports and resources (ibid). Kemshall and 
colleagues (2005) concluded that risk management was generally good when 
participants followed MAPPA structures and procedures and had enough administrative 
support. 
 
3.67 More recent analysis of the use of MAPPA in England and Wales (Wood and Kemshall, 
2007) found that areas commonly relied on external control such as licence conditions 
and restrictions on behaviour and contact to manage offenders in the community. 
Successful relationships with supervision staff increased compliance both with these 
external measures and with supervision and treatment programmes to address 
offenders’ internal controls. Programme interventions appeared to have produced 
behavioural changes. Wider public disclosure measures appeared to be counter-
productive, though discretionary disclosure, usually with the offender’s consent, 
appeared to enhance public protection. 
 
3.68 In the case of restricted patients, the enquiry into the case of Mr L and Mr M (MWC 
2006) and subsequent response from the Scottish Executive and colleagues (2006) 
emphasise that medical treatment does not equate to risk management. The 
government response to the inquiry concluded that a patient’s risk must always be 
considered separately, regardless of recovery and response to treatment, and must 
determine the degree of restriction appropriate. 
 
Risk management in practice 
 
3.69 An important concern about extending MAPPA provisions in Scotland to violent 
offenders is the risk that the number of violent offenders would overload the process 
and make it unworkable. The literature review therefore needed to explore examples of 
practice elsewhere to see whether this concern was valid. The MAPPA process in 
England and Wales applies to both sexual and violent offenders, so their experience 
should shed light on what the Scottish system may expect. 
 
3.70 In one of the few studies conducted on MAPPA so far, Wood (2006) found an even 
spread of sexual and violent offences amongst Level 3 cases (who require the most 
intensive level of supervision and support) rather than a predominance of violent 
offenders. Scott and colleagues (2007) reported similar findings in their review of the 
first five years of MAPPA, showing 40% violent offenders and 45% sexual offenders at 
MAPPA Level 3, and 34% violent and 48% sexual offenders at Level 2 in 2005/6. 
Further, introduction of the Violent Offender & Sex Offender Register (ViSOR) shared 
national database means that one police officer should be able to manage about 50 
offenders on this system (Child Protection Audit and Review, 2002). 
 
3.71 Of interest was the fact that 14% of people registered at Level 3 in Wood’s (2006) study 
were unconvicted. Most of this group had mental health problems and were therefore 
best placed to be managed through mental health services. However Wood raised 
concerns about the lack of clarity and potential human rights issues in sharing 
information about this group between agencies when they were not technically 
‘offenders’. 
 
3.72 Finally, one element of risk management not always taken into account is the risk to 
staff responsible for supervising offenders. Risk management plans can usefully include 
considerations of the impact of violence against staff as well as planning and action for 
this (Bowers et al, 2006). Denney and O'Beirne (2003) looked at violence perpetrated 
against probation officers and found that the managerial response to this has been 
largely defensive and piecemeal without adequate training or organisational support. 
Operational staff such as nurse practitioners often have a great deal of practical 
knowledge and experience in working with high risk groups and are likely to be able to 
contribute more effectively to risk management strategies (Notarianni et al, 2007).  
 
3.73 Social workers may ask families and carers to contribute to risk assessment or 
management. Formal opportunities for this have recently been introduced into the 
Scottish Prison Service’s Integrated Case Management Process, although this applies 
primarily to long-term prisoners and is at the discretion of social work teams. The Mental 
Welfare Commission (2006) directs that the principles of the Mental Health (Care and 
Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 should be considered in deciding whether to share risk 
assessment and management plans with the patient and his or her carers. 
 
3.74 Structured assessment procedures and protocols for managing risk factors in a multi-
disciplinary context have been found to be effective (Tiffin and Kaplan, 2004) and form 
the basis of approaches to risk management such as MAPPA. The next section looks at 
this in more detail including the problems associated with multi-agency working. 
 MULTI-AGENCY WORKING, ORGANISATIONAL ISSUES AND TRAINING 
 
3.75 Research in the Netherlands found consensus ratings of risk of violence to be the best 
predictors (De Vogel and De Ruiter, 2006). This ‘group’ approach to assessment and 
management of risk is common practice in forensic mental health settings and forms the 
basis of processes such as MAPPA, which by design increase the level of information 
available for defensible decisions to be made. The AIM assessment framework 
(Assessment, Intervention & Moving on) (Print et al, 2000) is another means of 
achieving this. Its purpose is to provide guidelines for practitioners from a wide range of 
agencies in order to give them a common language and a shared approach to tackling 
harmful behaviour. SWIA (2007) noted examples of good practice in Scotland in which 
offenders with histories of serious violent offending and of mental health problems were 
being managed through close joint working between criminal justice social work 
services, forensic mental health services and the police. 
 
3.76 Earlier literature, however, gives repeated evidence of failures in multi-agency working. 
The Bichard Inquiry in England and Wales (2004) found problems with information 
sharing between social services, the police, and other systems such as the Child 
Protection Database. In Scotland, the Caleb Ness Inquiry (O’Brien et al, 2003) noted an 
over-reliance on the judgment of individual case coordinators, none of whom knew all 
the relevant facts, as well as “alarming variations in agency managers’ expectations of 
the appropriate level of monitoring. At every level, in several agencies, the phrase ‘high 
level of monitoring’ had different meanings” (p8).  
 
3.77 Rather than working collaboratively, the Caleb Ness Inquiry found a tendency among 
all agencies to make assumptions about the knowledge, training, and actions of others. 
This was particularly evident in the lack of communication between social workers in 
Children and Families teams and Criminal Justice social workers who, despite both 
being part of Social Work services, did not routinely work together. Exchange of 
information between police and social work agencies was equally lacking, as was 
information sharing with health care and addiction workers. Problems in sharing 
information were also highlighted in the work of the Social Work Inspection Agency 
(2005) and in the Child Protection Audit and Review (2002). The latter reported 
particular difficulties in the sharing and transfer of information between the Children’s 
Hearings System and the Criminal Justice system, with additional confusion regarding 
the status of residential schools in the risk assessment process. 
 
3.78 In Canada, multi-disciplinary approaches were intended to offer a more neutral and 
objective means of deciding dangerousness (Connelly and Williamson, 2000; 
Federal/Provincial/ Territorial Task Force, 1995), though such an approach made 
challenging those assessments difficult for offenders (Jackson, 1997; Bonta et al, 1996). 
Grant (1998) argues that the apparent objectivity and neutrality of the multi-disciplinary 
approach for deciding dangerousness may give the (false) impression that risk 
prediction is an exact instrument.  
 
3.79 The Cosgrove Report (2001) noted a tendency for agencies to focus on improving their 
own internal procedures rather than in improving links with others. Offenders can 
therefore learn to exploit gaps between systems. The Report consequently 
recommended a more collaborative approach to risk management and delivery of 
services, including improvements in the quality and flow of information. The Cosgrove 
Committee endorsed a structured clinical approach to risk assessment but added that 
specific risk assessment tools did not necessarily need to be standardised: each 
profession may reasonably have its own tools that reflect its own area of work, provided 
that the tool fits within a structured clinical approach (though standardised tools at a 
local level are likely to be of assistance) (Hawley et al, 2006). More important is 
consistency of approach to enable interpretation and understanding between 
professions and effective implementation and use of existing tools. 
 
3.80 Langan and Lindow (2004) found serious gaps and inaccuracies in information held 
about service users that potentially put them and others at risk. A review of serious 
violent and sexual offenders in Scotland (Loucks, 2002; also Cosgrove Report, 2001) 
reported similar problems with case files, ranging from poor quality of information to a 
complete absence of files or parts of files from Prison Service records.  
 
3.81 The Child Protection Audit and Review (2002) raised the issue of risk management of 
people previously dealt with under the Children’s Hearings System. The Review 
indicated that young people who had committed sexual offences but who had been 
dealt with under the Children’s Hearing System are not required to register as sex 
offenders once they enter the adult system. It consequently recommended that 
arrangements should allow non-registered juvenile sex offenders to be brought into 
structured risk assessment and management arrangements when necessary without 
regard to their age or whether the children’s hearing or adult system dealt with their 
offending behaviour (ibid). 
 
3.82 In view of these difficulties, the Child Protection Audit and Review (2002) 
recommended the development of a consistent framework across Scotland for 
assessment including the need to document and review all decision making procedures 
and processes and to continue to review methods of risk management. The Review 
stated that standardisation of practice is critical both to individual agencies and to how 
agencies work in partnership. A further suggestion was the establishment of a case 
manager where more than one social work team is involved. The National Probation 
Service in England and Wales (2006a) noted a similar need for continuity and clarity of 
lead responsibility, particularly for offenders assessed as posing a high risk of harm. 
Arguably the subsequent role of the Responsible Authorities and MAPPA coordinators 
has addressed this recommendation for higher risk cases. However, the fact that such a 
recommendation was made in England and Wales, where MAPPA procedures have 
been operational for some time, suggests this may not be enough. 
 
3.83 The Scottish Executive Information Steering Group Concordat (2005) 5 has gone some 
way towards addressing the need for improved information sharing between agencies. 
Although it has no legal standing, the Concordat gives guidance to a wide range of 
agencies both in and out of the criminal justice system and facilitates the sharing of 
information and collaboration between them. The Concordat applies specifically to the 
sharing of information about sex offenders at present but provides a useful template to 
extend such an agreement to information sharing about other high risk offenders. 
 
3.84 In England and Wales, assessment of offenders continues throughout the sentence. 
Once operational, OASys should enable regular electronic exchange of information 
between probation and prison staff to ensure access to full information and avoid 
duplication of effort (National Probation Service, 2005c). England and Wales has also 
established a recall Forum to oversee and review recall arrangements and working 
practices, identify and tackle gaps in information, improve liaison between the relevant 
                                                 
5 The Information Sharing Steering Group Concordat (ISSG) allows for the sharing of information about sex 
offenders in order to enhance inter-agency management of this group of offenders. It has been endorsed and 
signed by all the relevant agencies (prosecutors, courts, the police, the SPS, criminal justice social work, 
housing, health and education. The ISSG was known to the majority of respondents, across all the agencies 
involved in this research, but given the fact that these respondents tended to be in senior positions themselves, 
this is perhaps not surprising. 
 
agencies, and review the collation and dissemination of management information 
(National Probation Service, 2005a). Nevertheless the National Probation Service 
(2006a) noted a need to improve work on risk of harm nationally including improving 
clarity of lines of responsibility.    
 
3.85 In Scotland, SWIA (2007) identified a number of obstacles to achieving improvements 
in partnership working, including difficulties in overcoming practical issues, 
incompatibility of IT systems, and different corporate mechanisms for quality assurance. 
They recommended that each Community Justice Authority area review their 
partnership arrangements in order to reach clear agreements about how to make better 
use of their joint resources. Responsible Authorities in MAPPA should also ensure that 
systems for data collection are in place to ensure that the required information is readily 
accessible and can be provided to the MAPPA Coordinator for collation (Scottish 
Government, 2007a).  
 
Organisational issues and accountability 
 
3.86 Much of the literature identifies organisational errors in the assessment and 
management of risk when things have gone wrong. The Bichard Inquiry (2004: 4), for 
example, found errors in one Constabulary’s local Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) that 
“were not systemic or corporate, but they were serious”, while in another constabulary, 
errors were both systemic and corporate rather than simply human error. In Scotland, 
the Caleb Ness Inquiry (O’Brien et al, 2003) identified failures to take into account 
readily available background information or to undertake a rigorous assessment of risk.  
 
3.87 Some structures for accountability in risk assessment and management are in place or 
have been considered. In England and Wales, the National Probation Service (2006a) 
recommends that the Probation Inspectorate undertake and publish a formal review in 
exceptional cases of serious further offending “in order to hold the authorities to account 
and to inform good practice” (p3). Kemshall and colleagues (2005) suggest that case-
based audits offer a number of benefits to ensure consistency and accountability. In 
Scotland, SWIA (2007) criticised many local authorities for lack of rigour in the 
processes for checking the quality of reports. SWIA consequently began an inspection 
of throughcare arrangements for high-risk prisoners in conjunction with HM Inspectorate 
of Prisons. 
 
Training 
 
3.88 In Australia, Douglas and Ogloff (2003) found that the confidence of assessors in using 
risk assessment tools affected the accuracy of these assessments, with more accurate 
assessments coming from raters who were more confident about their judgments. A 
confident workforce is also essential for practice to move away from risk-averse, 
reactive decision making (Barry, 2007). Training is therefore central to effective violence 
risk assessment and management. 
 
3.89 The literature has recorded a number of shortfalls in training in this area. The Bichard 
Inquiry in England and Wales (2004) found that police were often ignorant about how 
records were created and how relevant IT systems worked. It also found that the 
guidance and training available were inadequate to the extent that “there was not even 
a common understanding of what was meant by ‘weeding’, ‘reviewing’ and ‘deletion’. It 
cannot now be ascertained how many records were lost without proper review” (p2). In 
Scotland, the Caleb Ness Inquiry (O’Brien et al, 2003) identified a lack of training that 
resulted in the lack of effective monitoring of the case under review. The Child 
Protection Audit and Review (2002) consequently recommended a review of staff 
training needs. 
 
3.90 The literature raised a variety of issues in terms of the types of training that was 
needed to improve the assessment and management of violent offenders. The 
Cosgrove Report (2001) recommended training and assistance for the adoption of 
structured clinical approaches to risk assessment as well as joint training of agencies to 
develop shared understandings and effective communication. Langan and Lindow 
(2004) found that staff needed training to counter institutional racism in terms of race 
equality training, cultural awareness, and a review of existing strategies. The Mental 
Welfare Commission (2006) insisted that social workers supervising conditionally 
discharged patients must be Mental Health Officers with the necessary training to carry 
out this responsibility. Particularly important in terms of risk assessment and 
management was uncertainty amongst staff about formal parameters in the use of 
discretion; SWIA (2007) believed that too much inconsistency was evident in the way 
staff used and recorded their personal discretion and that National Standards did not 
offer a clear enough framework in this area. 
 
3.91 The Scottish Government will be introducing the LS/CMI for use as a standardised tool 
for risk assessment and information sharing between the Scottish Prison Service and 
Criminal Justice Social Work. SWIA notes that the Government will need to manage the 
introduction of this new risk assessment framework very carefully, supported by clear 
guidance to staff and by a high quality training programme, if it is to improve the overall 
standard of risk assessment. Plans for use of the LS/CMI in Scotland do not currently 
extend to the health service, though the Mental Welfare Commission (2006) 
recommended some form of systematic approach to risk assessment and management 
within the forensic psychiatry service. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
3.92 Overall, the literature review shows that definitions of risk and risk assessment in 
relation to violence or indeed what violence is or who violent offenders are remain far 
from straightforward. While definitions share common themes, legal concepts remain 
woolly, such as how to assess whether someone poses a continuing threat to society. 
Even terms such as ‘high risk’ mean different things in different contexts: high risk of 
reoffending does not necessarily make someone ‘dangerous’, for example, if the risk of 
harm is low. Definitions of people as ‘dangerous’ pose the most difficulty, with 
diagnoses relating as much to political expediency as to forensic criteria and the focus 
on perceived risk guiding decision makers towards defensive practice. Violent offenders 
are a heterogeneous group that can be difficult to ‘compartmentalise’ either from other 
types of offenders (violent and sexual offenders are not necessarily distinct groups, for 
example) or from other violent offenders (for example perpetrators of domestic violence 
can be specialist or generalist violent offenders).  
 
3.93 A range of characteristics describe violent offenders, though these are largely similar to 
those for offenders in general and do not easily identify a violent ‘type’ or, more 
specifically, a ‘dangerous’ violent offender. A structured clinical approach to 
assessment drawing upon both static and dynamic factors appears to be of most use 
in practice. A wide range of tools is available for violence risk assessment, with some 
standing out as more commonly used and accepted. Arguably no single tool is 
appropriate for all such assessments (cf Bonta, 2007), and much research advocates 
the use of specialist tools for specific types of violence (e.g., the SARA for domestic 
violence and the SAM for stalking; Kropp et al, 1995 and 2006).  
 
3.94 Violence risk assessment has a tendency to focus primarily on prediction of risk. 
However, the literature suggests that assessment is more effectively used as a guide 
for treatment and management. The literature also argues for specialist tools for 
specific types of offenders (eg women, young people, ethnic minorities). Consideration 
should also be given to how thresholds of risk are applied in assessment and the 
extent to which distinct groups may be brought together inappropriately, such as for 
people diagnosed with different types of psychopathic disorders. 
 
3.95 The literature showed that collaborative risk management including user involvement 
and attention to factors that underlie offending behaviour are worth encouraging. 
Retributive approaches are not adequate if they fail to follow up with treatment, 
motivation for compliance, and support. Meanwhile appropriate responses to people 
assessed at various levels of risk remain unclear and must be based on individual 
assessments of and responses to risk and need. Full information must be available to 
prepare strategies for risk management, though practice is for decisions to rely on 
partial accounts. Risk management can however be effective where adequate 
structures, supports and training are in place. 
 
3.96 Organisations involved in risk assessment and management need to adopt a more 
participative, holistic and proactive approach which enables effective communication 
within and between agencies as well as organisational flexibility and performance 
incentives (Barry, 2007). MAPPA procedures should enable this in relation to qualifying 
offenders, though in Scotland this remains to be seen. National structures for 
accountability and training should go some way towards improving levels of information 
and collaboration as well as confidence amongst staff in risk assessment and 
management of violent offenders. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4. 
 
DEFINING THE ISSUES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
4.1 One of the aims of the interviews in Phases I and III was to ascertain the extent of 
understanding and congruence between the different agencies in relation to definitions 
of risk, violence and harm. This was seen as crucial in informing a framework for risk of 
violence assessment, not least when all the relevant agencies in criminal justice or 
forensic mental health were expected to work more closely and collaboratively in 
reducing the risk of harm to offenders, victims and the wider public. This chapter 
therefore examines the varying classification systems and definitions of risk, harm and 
violence across the agencies concerned and also briefly summarises the main issues 
relating to each agency in terms of inter-agency cooperation. It should be borne in mind 
that the direct views of respondents contained in this and the following chapter were 
inevitably hypothetical in respect of more formal arrangements for assessing risk of 
violence (since none exist at present) and thus presented more of a ‘wish list’ than an 
evidence-based critique of existing practice.  
 
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS 
 
4.2 The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 defines the criteria for risk as: 
 
the nature of, or the circumstances of the commission of, the offence of which 
the convicted person has been found guilty either in themselves or as part of a 
pattern of behaviour are such as to demonstrate that there is a likelihood that 
he, if at liberty, will seriously endanger the lives, or physical or psychological 
well-being, of members of the public at large (ibid, 210E). 
 
The RMA uses this as its definition of risk criteria (RMA 2006: 51 and 2007: 126), and  
stresses that assessing the nature, likelihood, frequency, duration, seriousness and 
imminence of an offence should take into account the risk of serious harm and the risk of 
reoffending (2006: 50). 
 
4.3 All agencies (Social Work, SPS, Health and Police) agree that definitions of risk, harm 
and violence can seem confused and confusing, and different agency remits only serve 
to exacerbate these distinctions: 
 
If you look at LS/CMI, what that would mean for low, medium, high. If you look 
at MAPPA. If you look at the HCR-20. If you look at the RMA. Those are four 
well thought out definitions. They all differ (prisons). 
 
4.4 Prior to the introduction of MAPPA, risk of reoffending was the primary focus of risk 
assessments, but MAPPA introduced the importance of assessing the additional risk of 
harm to inform case management planning. This seems to have caused some confusion 
amongst those respondents, notably in social work, who are more familiar with risk of 
reoffending or who consider risk of reoffending assessments to be difficult to combine 
with risk of harm assessments. Currently, social workers might use LSI-R to assess the 
former and RA1-4 to assess the latter, and although there is an expectation that they 
combine the two to draw conclusions, there are challenges in doing this. Firstly, not all 
local authorities (even within the same CJA) use these two tools: some use different 
tools and some do not use both in combination at the initial assessment stage. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, several respondents suggested confusion 
over how feasible it was to combine reoffending and harm in one assessment and 
whether such assessments were necessarily subjective in nature. As one respondent 
noted: 
 
You would hope, wouldn’t you, that in a bunch of 10 social workers, that they 
would be scoring it very similar, but that isn’t the case (Social work). 
 
4.5 Equally, some offences (especially where the offender tends to specialise in one type 
of crime) do not necessarily constitute a risk of violence (e.g., non-contact sexual 
offending), and whilst an individual may score high on risk of reoffending, they may 
concurrently score low on risk of harm, and vice versa. One local authority social work 
department (which worked closely with its health colleagues), one police respondent 
and several health respondents suggested that risk of harm should be the primary 
concern rather than risk of reoffending, since risk of harm encapsulated not only past 
concerns, but also considered future potential scenarios and current or changing 
circumstances, irrespective of the offender’s previous record. Although there may be a 
political focus on risk of reoffending, it was argued by the majority of respondents that 
risk of harm should be the defining feature of any risk assessment, using risk 
formulation and scenario planning to inform risk management. 
 
MAPPA classifications 
 
4.6 The Scottish Government (2007b) classifies the offenders who pose risk of harm, 
rather than offences per se, under three categories within the MAPPA guidance, 
namely: 
 
• Category 1 - registered sex offenders; 
• Category 2 – those convicted on indictment of an offence inferring personal 
violence who are subject to a probation order, or who are or will be on release from 
prison subject to statutory supervision in the community; and those persons 
acquitted on grounds of ‘insanity’ or found to be ‘insane’ following proceedings 
taken on indictment; 
• Category 3 - those convicted of an offence who may cause serious harm to the 
public.  
 
4.7 Whilst some respondents were happy to work with the MAPPA categories 
(predominantly social work staff), equal numbers felt that these would be less helpful in 
assessing and managing risk of violence (predominantly mental health staff), not least 
because of the heterogeneity of violence which is described later in this chapter and the 
wide range of offences that result from that violence. However, some of these 
differences of opinion were put down to agency remits and constituents, as outlined in 
the penultimate section of this chapter, although other differences related to whether 
risk assessment was seen to be about resource management, rehabilitation or public 
protection. Nevertheless, these MAPPA classifications have been shown to be effective 
in England and Wales in terms of violent offenders (Kemshall et al, 2005; Wood and 
Kemshall, 2007). The MAPPA evaluations in England and Wales suggested that over 
time, practitioners become more familiar with the distinctions between categories and 
can use them more consistently and more confidently as a result (ibid). It needs to be 
borne in mind that the criticisms raised in this chapter are taken from a small and select 
group of respondents, mainly managers rather than practitioners, and are hypothetical 
not least given the fact that the MAPPA classifications have yet to apply in practice in 
Scotland to violent offenders and had only applied to sex offenders for six months at the 
time of interview. 
 4.8 MAPPA categories were considered to be, on the one hand, too loose to help staff 
target those most in need or considered most ‘risky’. Category 3 was singled out in this 
respect as a ‘catch-all’ category: ‘The get-out clause is the third criteria… any other 
scary person really’ (CJAs). In England and Wales, Wood (2006) found that 14% of her 
sample of MAPPA cases were unconvicted offenders at the time of entering category 3, 
and previous convictions that suggested a violent propensity may relate to the distant as 
well as the recent past. Equally, category 3 offenders may not necessarily be on 
statutory supervision, and those finally released from prison after being recalled 
following breach of licence conditions may also not be under any statutory obligation for 
supervision on release. Such voluntary engagement would not only have resource 
implications for social work in particular, but also compliance implications for all 
agencies offering support to those offenders. With category 3 offenders, there were also 
inferences made that different areas may make local decisions as to who to bring into 
MAPPA under category 3, which may exacerbate the drive towards greater consistency 
of approach across the country. 
 
4.9 On the other hand, MAPPA categories were also deemed too rigid through not covering 
all eventualities of risk of violence. Category 2 was criticised by the majority of 
respondents for only focusing on convicted violent offenders and within that group only 
those convicted on indictment. Mental health respondents in particular took this line of 
argument, perhaps because they deal with mentally disordered ‘offenders’ irrespective 
of whether they are involved in the Criminal Justice system or not. Respondents 
generally felt that focusing on convicted offenders on indictment was possibly too 
narrow in terms of violent offenders, not least because the harm caused by an offence 
may be wider and more serious than assumed by dint of the offence being convicted on 
indictment. Summary cases were seen as an important addition to the criteria for 
MAPPA inclusion, especially cases of domestic abuse which often do not constitute 
indictable offences, if convicted at all. Conversely, however, respondents acknowledged 
that some indictment convictions did not necessarily infer a serious risk of harm. 
 
4.10 Groups or offences not covered under the above definition include many public order 
offences, domestic violence offences, those released from prison without licence or 
supervision conditions, those who are seen as a potential threat to public safety (e.g., 
youth gangs), those convicted in summary courts and all pre-convicted offenders. One 
respondent suggested that the reporting rate, the detection rate and the conviction rate 
are minimal in comparison to the prevalence of violent offending in Scotland and that 
the Criminal Justice system only skims the surface in dealing mainly with ‘the feckless 
and the stupid’ who are caught and found guilty. 
 
4.11 The greatest concern lay in the fact that there were a lot of violent, or potentially violent, 
people who were either unconvicted or convicted in the summary courts, as the 
following quotations illustrate: 
 
What about the people up to the point of conviction or what about the person 
who has a history of violence but is currently involved with the system because 
of theft or road traffic offences and what about the whole issue of domestic 
violence? (Social work). 
 
… you do need to have scope wherein you could say these individuals have 
not done this before, but it really looks like they might, and therefore we need 
to manage them. So the classic example of that would maybe be… a family 
that’s splitting up and the husband’s saying - they’ve maybe got no track record 
of violent behaviour - and he’s saying: ‘if I don’t get custody of the kids, I’m 
going to, you know, kill them and then myself’… I think MAPPA should 
encompass this, people who have not already been seriously violent, but 
there’s sufficient evidence to raise concerns (Prisons). 
 
4.12 However, such early intervention has major human rights implications, which coupled 
with the possibility of netwidening and increased workload, would make it difficult to 
implement. There was a fear of MAPPA being swamped by too broad a target group 
and too broad eligibility criteria, not least when many of these cases may be mental 
health ‘patients’ rather than criminal justice ‘offenders’. Whilst early intervention and 
prevention are laudable from a support perspective, they have major resource 
implications as well as a need for a change in organisational culture and philosophy – 
and possibly legislation, and perhaps the success of MAPPA to date has given agencies 
a false sense of optimism about what is possible in terms of intervention overall. It was 
not an intention of MAPPA to broaden the target group but to limit it to the ‘critical few’. 
As one mental health respondent commented in this regard: ‘being a MAPPA case will 
become meaningless’. 
 
4.13 One social work respondent also suggested that some staff will not have access to 
court-based information on whether a charge was on indictment at the point of possible 
referral to MAPPA. What offences are deemed ‘indictable’ may also vary within local 
Crown Offices (those marking the cases) and within local sheriffdoms (sheriffs choosing 
to refer a matter to a higher court): the index offence, whilst not necessarily relating to 
violence, may well mask previous allegations relating to that offender’s past. Equally, 
one social work respondent felt that those on community service (following a conviction 
on indictment) would not be covered by the MAPPA arrangements, even though it could 
be argued that community service is higher tariff than probation but does not require 
statutory supervision as such. Equally, one social work representative pointed out that 
‘not everyone who’s committed a violent offence gets put on probation. Far from it’. 
 
4.14 From a Community Justice Authority perspective, with its emphasis on community 
safety, the focus on convictions and indictment alone does not fully cover public 
protection issues or fear of crime, neither of which could necessarily be eased by 
targeting those convicted on indictment: 
 
You will have people who have been convicted on indictment because they 
have committed very serious offences like murder or whatever, but the chances 
of them reoffending are probably fairly slim, so really where you want to be 
targeting your resources are where the concern lies… in terms of community 
safety (CJAs). 
 
4.15 There was also a suggestion that current MAPPA arrangements may have 
inadvertently diverted resources away from unconvicted or non-registered sex 
offenders, leaving the latter more marginalised in terms of assessment and intervention. 
Whilst the inclusion of unconvicted cases of violence was seen as important in the 
future by, for example, mental health representatives (because violence and harm were 
still prevalent irrespective of criminal justice system involvement), respondents 
acknowledged that social work had no remit and no resources to work with unconvicted 
individuals other than those on bail. However, there are examples in Scotland where the 
police, social work and mental health have arrangements in place for overseeing 
unconvicted sex offenders, sometimes even within existing MAPPA arrangements. 
 
Definitions of harm 
 
4.16 MAPPA definitions of ‘risk of serious harm’, taken from the most recent (September 
2007) third version of the MAPPA Guidance, are as follows: 
 • Very high risk - There is imminent risk of serious harm. The potential event is more 
likely than not to happen imminently, and the impact could be serious; 
 
• High risk - There are identifiable indicators of risk of serious harm. The potential 
event could happen at any time and the impact could be serious; 
 
• Medium risk - There are identifiable indicators of risk of serious harm. [Name] has 
the potential to cause harm, but is unlikely to do so unless there is a change of 
circumstances; 
 
• Low risk - Current evidence does not indicate likelihood of causing serious harm. 
 
4.17 With the same caveats about the small sample size mentioned above, these definitions 
of risk of harm, like those of the category of offender, also received mixed reactions 
from respondents, with a tendency for social work to agree with them, since they 
broadly matched the definitions in the RA1-4 guidance. However one social work 
representative felt that the MAPPA guidance was at odds with tools such as RA1-4 and 
LSI-R which tended to measure risk of reoffending and reconviction rather than 
seriousness and imminency of harm per se. However, the introduction of LS/CMI will 
clarify this issue since it is more likely to identify both reoffending and harm. Mental 
health representatives were more likely to disagree with the MAPPA definitions, 
suggesting that they were not congruent with their particular value base. Kemshall et al 
(2005)   and the Royal College of Psychiatrists (2004) also found similar criticisms from 
mental health colleagues about seemingly imposed criminal justice definitions, but this 
is perhaps more a matter of achieving greater understanding of different agency remits 
and responsibilities rather than questioning the definitions upon which those 
responsibilities are put into practice. 
 
THE HETEROGENEITY OF VIOLENCE 
 
4.18 The Scottish Executive Information Sharing Steering Group Concordat (2005) defines a 
violent offender as an offender that has been convicted of a violent offence under the 
Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 and has received the appropriate 
sentence as identified under Schedule 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.   In contrast, 
a ‘dangerous’ offender, according to the Concordat, is an offender with a relevant 
offence who demonstrates behaviour that is deemed to pose a significant risk of harm to 
the public.   A Potentially Dangerous Person follows the same criteria but has no 
conviction or relevant offence.  The criteria for establishing the risk of ‘dangerousness’ 
in Scottish legislation have been set by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, at 
Section 210E in relation to the Order for Lifelong Restriction, and has been adopted by 
the RMA in its own standards and guidelines (RMA, 2006; 2007; see also para 4.2 
above). 
 
4.19 Within the current research, violence as an action was distinguished from harm as the 
impact of that action, and several respondents inferred that the two had to be kept 
separate in terms of both assessment and management of risk. There was often no 
common understanding of levels of, or responses to, violence risk across or even within 
agencies, and definitions of violence may vary according to the agency’s legal 
requirements (e.g., forensic mental health is bound by definitions contained in the 
Mental Health Act) or according to its adopted definition (the Violence Reduction Unit6, 
for example, adopted the definition of violence used in the World Health Organisation’s 
World Report on Violence and Health, 2002, which one respondent described as 
‘everything from bullying to suicide’). Equally, closed institutions (for example, prisons or 
psychiatric hospitals) may have a less tolerant definition of violence because of their 
close proximity to ‘inmates’ or ‘patients’ respectively, and their definition can include 
verbal aggression to staff as well as aggression to property or other inmates or patients. 
 
4.20 However, two broad types of violence were identified at interview: instrumental (‘cold, 
calculating’, pre-meditated and a means to an end) and impulsive (emotion-driven, 
uncontrolled and an end in itself), although both types could well be combined in the 
same act. Violence could also be incidental and, within individuals, could come in peaks 
and troughs, depending on lifestyle (e.g., substance misuse) or provocation, and 
assessment needs to accommodate psychological as well as physical violence and 
psychological as well as physical harm (to victims or society more generally). 
 
                                                 
6 The Violence Reduction Unit was set up in 2005 to target violent behaviour within Strathclyde, its remit being 
extended nationwide in 2006. Its two main aims are to contain and manage the problem of violence and to work 
with partners and communities to develop and implement cross-sector policies in order to change attitudes and 
deliver a sustainable reduction in violence in Scotland. 
Differences between sexual and violent offenders 
 
4.21 There was concern amongst the majority of respondents that interventions (including 
MAPPA) would need to vary between violent and sexual offenders because of their 
different characteristics and propensities to pose risk. Respondents saw distinct 
differences between the characteristics of violent offenders and those of sexual 
offenders, with sex offenders being seen generally as more of an homogeneous and 
compliant group than violent offenders, making risk assessment and management 
easier. This ‘myth’ about sex offenders being more readily identifiable or compliant is 
not, however, borne out by the literature7, and suggests that similar risk management 
plans, interventions and treatments can be applied to them across the board, which is 
not the case in practice. Equally, there is little research to suggest that violent offenders 
will be less compliant than sex offenders, but this was nevertheless considered to be an 
important factor by respondents in this research when introducing violent offenders into 
MAPPA. However, in terms of compliance, one respondent suggested that if the 
individual was constructively involved in the risk assessment and management plan, 
compliance was more likely, irrespective of their offending propensities (see ‘user 
involvement’ in Chapter 3). It would thus be important for the risk assessment tool to 
include an element of self-assessment. However, having said that, one respondent 
remarked sceptically that: 
 
Sex offenders are more likely to show up for supervision, but they’re more likely 
to be lying to you as well about what they’re up to (Prisons). 
 
4.22 Some respondents suggested that Scotland has a different ‘culture of violence’ than 
perhaps south of the border, and certainly would have a higher proportion of potentially 
violent offenders in MAPPA than in England and Wales, where the ratio of violent to 
sexual offenders was the reverse of that anticipated in Scotland. Violence was also 
seen as being concentrated in specific areas, notably parts of Glasgow (Houchin, 2005), 
as one SPS respondent noted: 
 
A shockingly high proportion of prisoners in the estate come from, sort of, like 3 
or 4 postcodes within the Glasgow area, you know, a shockingly high 
proportion (Prisons).  
 
                                                 
7 With the possible exception of incest offenders (Waterhouse et al, 1994). 
4.23 There may also be a higher threshold of tolerance of violence in some areas of 
Scotland than elsewhere, both within communities and in the wider public perception: 
 
There’s not really a stigma attached to being violent in Scotland, in some ways 
there’s a kudos attached to being violent… it is very much seen as a legitimate 
way of problem solving… that’s entrenched within them (Policy). 
 
4.24 Whilst one mental health representative suggested that ‘once a sex offender, always a 
sex offender’, it was also suggested that sexual offending was not ubiquitous or 
culturally-specific and that sex offenders could otherwise lead pro-social lives. Although 
one policy respondent equally suggested that violent offenders could also ‘be capable of 
being very controlled in the ways they think’, it was generally felt that violence was more 
likely to be entrenched, and triggered more easily by alcohol or drug misuse. Sex 
offenders were also seen as more likely to offend on their own (even if part of a 
paedophile network, for example), whereas: 
 
Violent offenders can be co-accused, part of a lot of different offences… part of 
an organised crime group, involving potentially drugs, firearms and weapons 
(Police). 
 
4.25 One respondent suggested that whilst sex offending was easier to predict, violent 
offending was not. In terms of assessment, sexual offenders were seen as easier to 
draw conclusions on (in terms of risk formulation8) as such offending was considered by 
one respondent to be ‘clear cut’, although the research literature would indicate that our 
knowledge of sexual predation is limited and the nature of such offending is often more 
complex (see para. 3.7 above). Violent offending was seen by respondents as 
ubiquitous, and not necessarily specific to particular populations or locations, making 
management of the risk potentially more problematic: 
 
If we are aware of a person with a mental illness who is a sex offender or who 
threatens sexual offences, then it is perfectly reasonable for us to inform the 
school where he works because it is highly likely he is going to be a risk to 
children. But just because someone is being violent, does that mean he is 
                                                 
8 ‘Risk formulation’ means synthesising and concluding on all the relevant information on a case to produce an 
explanation or ‘narrative’ of that person’s risk factors and the implications of this for treatment and management 
(see also RMA 2007b). 
going to be a risk to everybody? And who do you inform that they are going to 
be violent? (Mental health). 
 
TARGET GROUPS FOR MAPPA 
 
4.26 Types of offence or offender which were mentioned as being eligible for MAPPA 
involvement under the violence categories were stalking, people with diagnosable 
mental health issues, domestic abuse, repeat offenders, those who refused to engage in 
programmes within prisons, and those posing a serious or imminent risk of harm. 
However, one mental health respondent suggested that the offence was less important 
than the context and circumstances of the offender. Serious offences and offenders at 
high risk of repeat violent offending were seen as the main target group for MAPPA, but 
some respondents felt that the context of any given community should also be taken 
into account since different communities may be prone to different types of violence 
(e.g., knife crime), again irrespective of whether convicted on indictment. Domestic 
abuse was seen as a significant omission in the MAPPA classification of ‘conviction on 
indictment’, since such offending requires specialist risk assessment techniques, if 
indeed it is reported at all9. Domestic abuse was usually against a known victim and 
involved elements of power and control within a given relationship; perpetrators of 
domestic abuse may otherwise lead law-abiding lifestyles. Stalking, on the other hand, 
was viewed as all-encompassing and personality-driven. 
 
4.27 One mental health representative expressed concern that mental disorder, as currently 
defined within MAPPA in Scotland, did not include [anti-social] personality disorders. 
This omission was possibly based on advice from psychiatrists who felt that personality 
disorders defied known medication and other treatment measures and could not, 
therefore, be given priority. This was seen as a major gap in the current arrangements, 
since a high proportion of prisoners, and violent offenders more generally, presented 
with personality disorders. For example, the international literature has suggested some 
50 – 80 per cent of prisoners present with a personality disorder (see, for example, 
Møller et al, 2007), although one SPS respondent suggested that this was, in effect, 
‘medicalising criminality’. One Parole Board member expressed concern that if these 
individuals were not given support, they would be more likely to be recalled to prison 
following release on licence. However, in terms of released prisoners, one respondent 
felt that those released on parole are less likely to reoffend having applied for parole 
                                                 
9 It was suggested at interview that female victims of domestic abuse were unlikely to report such abuse until 30 
plus incidents had been experienced. 
compared with those released automatically on non-parole licence at the two-thirds 
stage of their sentence, which may have implications for the inclusion of violent ex-
prisoners on non-parole licence within MAPPA. 
 
4.28 The possibility of a violence register, along the lines of the sex offender register, was 
raised as a possibility towards the end of the Phase I interviews and was therefore 
explored with Phase III interviewees. The advantages of a register were seen to be that 
it might lessen the likelihood of netwidening because of strict criteria for registration, it 
could be accessible to all agencies across the country and would stipulate who was on 
licence/probation and for how long (information which apparently only currently exists in 
paper files). A ‘flag’, such as that recommended in the Cosgrove Report (2001) and the 
Child Protection Audit and Review (2002; see Chapter 3, para 3.56), may be preferable 
to a register, however, to identify potential behaviour relevant to violent or sexual 
offending, even where a further offence has not been committed. Nevertheless, ViSOR 
currently fulfils this role and it would seem premature to duplicate or extend this 
resource not least when the evaluation of ViSOR is imminent in Scotland. The 
disadvantages of a separate register were seen to be the scale of the task (in 
Strathclyde alone, it was suggested that there could be five times as many violent 
offenders as sex offenders liable for registration), the fact that violence was too variable 
compared with sex offending to allow for strict criteria for inclusion on a register, and the 
likelihood that a register would be incriminating, stigmatising and open to political 
manipulation. The literature supports this latter view, namely that ‘dangerousness’ is 
extremely difficult to assess and that labelling people as such can result in inaccurate 
and indeterminate records being kept on them. 
 
4.29 There was some concern that, whilst individuals may continue to pose a serious risk, 
intervention would need to end when their registration or supervision requirements end, 
although this has admittedly always been the case, irrespective of MAPPA 
arrangements. However, although sex offenders have been mentioned as tending to be 
‘cooperative’ beyond the period of registration or social work intervention, the same may 
not be true of violent offenders. Agencies would also have no power to impose further 
conditions or requirements on an individual unless the legislation changed or 
registration was indeterminate or for life.  
 
AGENCY REMITS AND CULTURES 
 
4.30 A tendency to use professional judgement, irrespective of the definition of violence 
used, not only applies within agencies, but also across agencies dealing with criminal 
justice and risk, especially when those agencies have differing remits and cultures and 
conceivably different definitions of – and response to - risk. Agency cultures can be 
entrenched, and bounded by different philosophies, constituents, protocols and 
priorities, yet they are being asked to practice collaboratively and consistently based on 
a drive towards an increasingly unified approach:  
 
We all know that we are talking about the same thing, but we view it differently 
(MAPPA). 
 
4.31 This section summarises some of those key differences within social work, SPS, the 
police, mental health and victims’ agencies. It should be borne in mind that, as will be 
seen in Chapter 5, multi-agency working was considered by all respondents as both 
positive and constructive in working collaboratively across Scotland. However, 
respondents were asked specifically to highlight any potential challenges to inter-agency 
cooperation which could be improved in relation to the introduction of violent offenders 
within a multi-agency framework. The following section draws out some of those 
challenges as well as highlighting the positive relationships that currently exist. 
 
Social Work 
 
4.32 Social workers aim to balance public protection with individual rehabilitation. Public 
protection includes victims as well as local communities, and rehabilitation requires 
addressing wider structural constraints on an individual’s social inclusion (e.g., housing 
and benefits). Social workers are also concerned to encourage independence and 
empowerment in their clients, and in terms of risk assessment, one social worker 
explained that ‘one of our tasks is to work with people in managing their own risks’. 
Whilst one social worker described risk assessment as their ‘bread and butter’, there 
was a perception by two respondents – in mental health and SPS – that social workers 
tend to rely more on actuarial methods than on professional judgement. If true, this 
perception could result from pressures on limited resources (both from a financial and 
programme perspective) which were a cause of concern for social work staff, but could 
equally result from there not being an adequate number of dedicated, specialist and 
trained practitioners to undertake risk assessments in social work (see chapter 5 for a 
resume of the training issues in risk of violence assessment). Generally speaking, social 
work and the police were seen as closest in practice when it came to risk of violence 
assessment, although their rationales for such assessments may differ. 
 
 
 
The Scottish Prison Service 
 
4.33 SPS currently does not have a working definition of risk of harm. Equally, because of its 
institutional focus, it tends to focus not on public protection but on containment of the 
individual and minimisation of risk of violence (to self or others) within the establishment. 
Many respondents expressed concern that this institutional focus in respect of risk 
assessment could no longer be sustained within a multi-agency forum, and respondents 
were encouraged by the Integrated Case Management system now operating within 
SPS which has helped to make SPS more ‘outward facing’: 
 
The prisons do a considerable amount of risk assessment of prisoners but very little 
of that risk assessment has anything to do with their level of behaviour in the public 
environment, in the community (Police). 
 
4.34 Although one SPS respondent considered that SPS spoke ‘with one voice’ (being the 
only unified agency across the spectrum of criminal justice agencies), another agency 
representative suggested that both within and between prison establishments there are 
different perspectives on assessment and management of risk, which if correct suggests 
that unification does not necessarily mean consistency of approach. Although a mental 
health respondent considered SPS more in tune with ‘structured professional 
judgement’ than, say, social workers, both social work and SPS respondents felt that 
SPS was more cautious about risk and may rely therefore on tools for assessing such 
risk. There was also concern from social work staff in particular that prison officers may 
not have adequate training or information, (the latter in respect of some more recently-
incarcerated offenders), to undertake violent risk assessments and that this could result 
in greater pressure being put on forensic psychologists or prison-based social workers 
to carry out such assessments. Equally, whilst one social work respondent suggested 
that vital information in prison-based files might be missing (e.g., the index offence that 
resulted in imprisonment; see also Loucks, 2002; Cosgrove Report, 2001), another 
social work respondent felt that SPS staff may present too much information for risk 
assessments because of under-confidence in extracting appropriate information for risk 
assessment purposes. 
 The Police 
 
4.35 Following the Sex Offenders Act (1997), the police remit broadened from assessment 
of risk to management of risk and offender reintegration, and Offender Management 
Teams were set up to coordinate the sex offender arrangements. These teams were 
highly praised at interview by other agencies, notably social work and mental health. 
Indeed, in terms of multi-agency working, the current relationship between the police 
and social work, in particular, was seen as extremely constructive and cooperative by all 
agencies, with one almost envying that relationship: 
 
[SPS] is impressed by the way that the police and social work have started 
working together over the last maybe five, ten years, and we want to get to the 
same point (Prisons). 
 
4.36 Not surprisingly, perhaps, given their focus on public protection and crime control, the 
police, like the SPS, are often seen by other agencies as ‘risk averse’, although they 
themselves would prefer to use the word ‘cautious’. This caution may result in a 
tendency to up-tariff individuals for public protection reasons, even though this may be 
at odds with the MAPPA aim of prioritising the ‘critical few’ based on imminence of 
serious harm.  
 
Mental Health 
 
4.37 Mental health workers are mainly concerned with the perpetrators of crime, who may 
well themselves be victims as well as patients. Mental health workers are also more 
bound – both legally and morally - by confidentiality issues. Broadly speaking, the NHS 
prioritises the presenting [medical] problem in their dealings with patients, as another 
agency respondent explained: 
 
Health don’t recognise offenders as a kind of specific client group. They see 
everybody as patients which is understandable and you shouldn’t have to go to 
your doctor and say ‘I have a headache - and I’m an offender just in case you 
need to know that’ (CJAs). 
 
4.38 Forensic mental health workers, however, do have a greater need to focus on the 
offending behaviour as well as the presenting medical condition and thus have 
minimisation of risk (primarily to patients and out-patients but increasingly to society at 
large) as their main focus over the longer term. However, there was concern from one 
social work respondent that mental health workers could only work with individuals who 
had diagnosed mental illnesses, and not with, for example, with those presenting with 
personality disorders (which, as mentioned above, are viewed as not easily diagnosed 
or treated). Although psychiatrists were deemed to prioritise cases according to specific 
medical diagnoses, at the possible expense of broader risk assessment per se, the 
Care Programme Approach (CPA)10 now places a greater emphasis on risk assessment 
and was described by one mental health respondent as a ‘mini-MAPPA’. Within the 
State Hospital, and arguably within the community, the concern of mental health 
practitioners and managers is not with targeting of resources, since there is less 
pressure to prioritise resources – within forensic mental health at least - but to identify 
appropriate treatment for each individual, based on need. Classification or ranking of 
harm is therefore deemed unhelpful when circumstances, potential risk and therefore 
treatment can vary over time.  
 
Victim agencies 
 
Risk assessments are done by and large based on what the offender [says]… 
their perception of the crime isn’t necessarily the same perception as [the 
victim] (Victims agency). 
 
4.39 Victims agencies receive the bulk of their information from the police, subject to the 
Data Protection Act. They are not given identifiable information about a specific 
offender, nor are they given an overview about other offenders living in close proximity 
to a victim which may impact either on the safety of staff visiting that victim or on the 
victim him/herself. Whilst victim agencies would prefer more information on offenders, 
there is an issue for some agencies in respecting the privacy of their clients, whether 
offender or victim. For example, one mental health respondent suggested that many of 
their patients could be seen as:  
 
… victims rather than offenders, particularly our outpatients, and I wouldn’t 
want their information to be divulged left, right and centre (Mental health). 
 
                                                 
10 The Care Programme Approach is a multi-agency arrangement for the non-compulsory treatment and care of 
people in the community with severe and enduring mental illness, to ensure that they receive appropriate 
services and resources. It includes an assessment not only of vulnerability but also of risk. 
4.40 Many respondents stressed the need to obtain the victim’s perspective within the risk 
assessment process, since the harm caused to the victim will contribute to determining 
the seriousness of the offence. However, in terms of risk management, neither the SPS 
nor the Parole Board will necessarily know who the victim is when someone is released 
from a prison sentence, and this may affect the quality and accuracy of the final 
intervention, not least where risk of harm is an issue: 
 
When they’re potentially thinking of releasing someone, they’ve got to sort of 
scurry round to see, does anyone know who the victim was. No idea (Victims 
agency). 
 
4.41 Victims’ agencies also felt that, since the majority of serious violent crimes, according 
to two respondents, are not reported to the police, victims will not necessarily be 
protected by MAPPA or any other criminal justice arrangements. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
4.42 Whilst there seemed to be concerns voiced by many respondents about the competing 
definitions of reoffending, violence and harm, there is a limit to how prescriptive and all-
encompassing any definition can be. However, classifications of offenders or offence 
types are necessary from a targeting point of view (in terms of numbers and resources).   
The MAPPA classifications, whilst welcomed as a guide, were seen to be open to 
interpretation and thus failed to offer definitive criteria for inclusion or exclusion of 
certain offence or offender types.   However, it would seem that one classification 
system and one working definition of harm across all agencies would be beneficial. 
 
4.43 In terms of the possible confusion over risk of reoffending versus risk of harm, notably 
amongst social work staff, it is acknowledged by the report writers that the 
implementation of the LS/CMI risk assessment tool, which combines risk of reoffending 
and risk of harm, will offset this confusion, although clear guidelines as to how to 
progress different types of offence, offender and risk will be needed beyond the initial 
assessment stage. Likewise, there were stark distinctions made between sex offenders 
and violent offenders in relation to risk, which concerned respondents in terms of 
ensuring the effective assessment and subsequent management of that risk. Risk 
formulation was seen as essential in that process, and to include the cultural context of 
violence in Scotland and an awareness of the psychological as well as physical 
consequences of violent crime. 
 4.44 Types of violent offender/offence type that were deemed eligible for MAPPA inclusion 
included repeat offenders, those at serious risk of imminent harm through violence, 
those with mental health issues (albeit not necessarily clinically diagnosed as such) and 
domestic abuse. 
 
4.45 In terms of competing agency remits and philosophies, social work tends to focus on 
the offender and his/her rehabilitation, which infers a greater need for social work staff 
to feel confident and skilled in using professional judgement alongside any risk 
assessment tools. 
 
4.46 SPS, on the other hand, focuses on containment within an institutional context but is 
increasingly aware of the need to look beyond that to the throughcare of offenders on 
release. The SPS system of record keeping could also be more complementary with 
those of other agencies involved in risk assessment and management. 
 
4.47 The police have a good reputation amongst other agencies for taking a longer term 
view of the assessment and management of convicted as well as unconvicted 
offenders, but tend to rely on tools rather than on professional judgement it making 
assessments of risk, not least given their primary public protection remit. 
 
4.48 Mental health professionals span a wide range of remits and ethical considerations and 
there is thus a tension currently between treating the ‘patient’ and assessing risk more 
widely. Although mental health practitioners, like their SPS counterparts, are becoming 
more ‘outward facing’, there was still seen to be a need by other agencies for health 
colleagues to broaden their criteria in terms of who they will work with and under what 
circumstances.  
 
4.49 Victim agencies feel a need to be more included in the risk assessment process, albeit 
within the confines of data protection requirements. It was stressed by many 
respondents that victims’ perspectives and fears of risk were a valuable addition to risk 
formulation and needed to be taken on board in any risk assessment framework, not 
least when the ‘victim’ and the ‘offender’ are often one and the same individual. 
 
 
 
 

CHAPTER 5. 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT IN PRACTICE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
5.1 The implications of differing definitions of risk and agency cultures will be bound to 
have an impact on risk assessment in practice, and indeed the previous chapter 
exemplifies those often confusing and contrasting views of respondents about how to 
assess and manage risk.   This chapter focuses in particular on their views of risk 
assessment tools, on their reasons for doing risk assessments and on organisational 
issues such as quality control, training and multi-agency working. 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS 
 
5.2 There was limited knowledge, in particular amongst social work respondents, about the 
various tools currently in use in assessing violence risk (VRAG, VRS and HCR-20), 
although this is perhaps understandable given that most violence risk assessment tools 
currently are used by mental health rather than social work, partly because the latter 
practitioners have concentrated their efforts recently in assessing risk of sexual 
offending within MAPPA rather than violence per se. However, as will be seen towards 
the end of this chapter, there is an issue about training, which if done at an appropriate 
time and within a multi-agency framework, can alleviate many of the concerns of staff 
about new methods of working, not least in respect of risk assessment tools. 
 
5.3 However, overall, there was some scepticism and criticism of those tools that were 
familiar to respondents and that these left a lot to the imagination, as the following 
quotation illustrates: 
 
… a warning light goes on when you see ‘high’, and there’s a sort of greenish 
light that goes on when you see ‘low’, and in the middle, you take into account 
all the factors… you’re on your own then… and therefore you make up your 
own mind from all the other information (Parole Board).  
 
5.4 For social work respondents in particular, although intended as a more static tool for 
predicting risk of reoffending, LSI-R was seen as focusing too much on static factors 
relating to risk of re-offending and could usefully include a risk of harm section. It was 
also seen as leaving too much to professional judgement, although having said that, 
many respondents suggested that a tool should be an ‘aide memoire’ rather than 
prescriptive. Equally, social work’s use of RA1-4 was seen by some respondents as 
restrictive in terms of its subjectivity (leaving too much to professional judgement), 
although it was only ever designed to structure professional judgement. It was also seen 
as cumbersome to complete. Likewise, although RM2000 is relatively effective in 
predicting risk of general reconviction for convicted male sex offenders, some 
respondents felt it could perform better in this regard. It was also seen as being overly 
static, with no risk of harm section, and only able to categorise offenders overall rather 
than to address concerns on a case by case basis.  
 
5.5 Psychiatrists use HCR-20 to assess both sexual and violence risk, but again was seen 
as being too subjective by, in particular, psychologists and required a level of clinical 
expertise which did not lend itself to wider use by basic-grade practitioners. However, 
actuarial tools were considered by one SPS respondent to be ‘handy screeners’ and 
therefore were perhaps more likely to be embraced by front-line practitioners when 
doing initial assessments. HRC-20 is also time consuming to complete, although in a 
hospital setting where patients may be admitted for longer periods of time, this was 
seen as a small consideration. More than any other tool where known to these 
agencies, HRC-20 was, however, seen as being better able to accommodate diversity, 
not least in respect of mental health issues. VRAG was also seen as too subjective and 
focusing on static factors (which in terms of diagnoses such as schizophrenia, for 
example, meant that it resulted in false positives or negatives when assessing risk). 
 
5.6 However, many of these concerns, as mentioned in the previous chapter, will be 
rectified by the introduction of LS/CMI. Kemshall (1998) also notes that these tensions 
between wanting the certainty of a tool but the leeway to exercise professional 
judgement are common amongst practitioners and managers alike. 
 
5.7 There were mixed messages across agencies as to whether violence risk assessment 
required one tool at the initial SER/HBR stage or several tools which could 
accommodate diversity (e.g., women, young people and perpetrators of domestic 
abuse). The majority view (held by social work and police respondents) was that there 
should be one risk assessment tool for violence (with add-on sections for specific 
groups or more specialist tools for more in-depth assessment, although mental health 
representatives tended to prefer a range of initial risk assessment tools, depending on 
the needs and circumstances of each individual being assessed.  
 
5.8 Either way, it was suggested by several respondents that a risk formulation component 
needs to be included in any risk assessment tool for violence along the lines of that 
provided by the RMA in its standards and guidelines for offenders subject to Orders for 
Lifelong Restriction (RMA, 2007b). In particular, one social work respondent argued that 
current risk assessment tools do not allow for risk formulation in terms of risk of harm, 
although LS/CMI, once introduced, will address this concern: 
 
[The tool] indicates clear risk in this person’s way of offending at this time… 
and it’s about the next bit that is missing… it still, to me, doesn’t include the 
harm element because all you know is that the potential is there for that person 
to re-offend, but to re-offend in what way and in what situation? (Social work). 
 
5.9 One tool used by both social work and mental health in one local authority – RAMAS 
(Risk Assessment, Management and Audit Systems) - purportedly covered not only risk 
of reoffending but also risk of violence and risk of harm and was considered useful in 
assessing all three issues in a graduated way. It is primarily an evidence-based 
Department of Health tool which has been validated in multi-disciplinary community and 
hospital mental health settings (DOH, 2000). 
 
RATIONALE FOR ASSESSING RISK 
 
5.10 There are two main focuses of risk assessment with any offender, not just violent 
offenders, and these are ‘operational’ and ‘rehabilitative’. An operational focus would be 
on statutory requirements, to target resources at the appropriate group, and to protect 
the public. A rehabilitative focus would be on the individual offender, with the risk 
assessment informing the identification and management and/or improvement of those 
risk factors which trigger offending and violence within that individual. Coming from the 
analysis of interviews was the impression that the police, social work and the SPS seem 
to take both an operational and rehabilitative approach in tandem and mental health 
primarily takes a rehabilitative approach. 
 
5.11 Colleagues in social work, the Police, MAPPA and SPS spoke mainly about the need to 
prevent reoffending by those posing a risk of harm to others, through early and 
constructive intervention and management of those risks. Social work was also 
concerned to ensure, through the assessment process, that offenders were suitable for 
community-based disposals and groupwork programmes. However, they also 
suggested that risk assessments could inform progress made by practitioners or the 
agency more generally through the monitoring and evaluation of statistics gained from 
risk assessments; to manage often limited resources; and to target those who have 
already been identified as high risk who require further input so as to protect the public 
at large. 
 
5.12 Mental health respondents saw risk assessments as primarily informing management 
plans for each offender, where interventions would not only protect the individual within 
the community but also, in so doing, protect the public from potential harm caused by 
that individual. As mentioned in Chapter 4, mental health workers seem more than the 
other professionals to be less constrained by financial concerns and were therefore less 
likely to cite targeting of limited resources as a rationale for undertaking risk 
assessments. Their primary concern is with the individual and his/her if not improved 
behaviour then at least contained behaviour in the community. 
 
5.13 Research suggests that agencies over-estimate the risk posed by offenders and 
likewise that guidance is needed on what constitutes ‘evidence’ of progress in 
minimising risk, since little research to date has identified effective measurement of 
reduced risk. When it came to upgrading or downgrading risk levels as a result of risk 
assessments, there was a difference of opinion between the agencies, possibly 
reflecting the different value bases of these agencies or of the workers within them.   
Whether risk is seen to be escalating or reducing ideally requires independent and well-
researched criteria, although within the agency context, the RMA (2007b) offers 
constructive guidelines on how practitioners themselves can effectively monitor and 
review change in an individual’s behaviour or risk factors. Downgrading was promoted 
by mental health respondents as resulting from a positive sign of progress for the 
individual and about the rights and freedom of the individual (through less intervention 
overall and offering the potential for movement to less secure units). However, social 
work staff seemed more wary than their mental health colleagues of downgrading, whilst 
the police were more likely to want to upgrade or maintain a consistent level, for fear of 
reprisals if things went wrong as a result of reduced intervention. There was concern, 
voiced by one MAPPA representative, that the public protection remit of the police may 
be at odds with the MAPPA remit of working with the ‘critical few’: 
 
[The police] are very conscious of public protection and it is better to up-tariff 
somebody and have additional supervision as it is to under-estimate, so there is a 
tendency to over-estimate somebody’s risk. This obviously runs contrary to the whole 
MAPPA concept and the guidance which is about doing, as far as possible, accurate 
risk assessments… because it is about allocation of resources and it is about 
targeting resources to those that we need to be paying the most attention to 
(MAPPA). 
 
5.14 Whilst ranking of risk is seen by many to be an essential means of targeting resources 
and interventions appropriately, one mental health respondent voiced the concerns of 
other health professionals that ranking was perhaps unhelpful from a mental health 
point of view because of the fluidity of people’s lifestyles and behaviours, the ranking of 
which might restrict the opportunity and scope for change: 
 
I don’t think [ranking] necessarily leads to good planning because people tend 
to think: ‘very high, don’t let him out’… if he’s not drinking and he’s not ill and 
he’s not in a relationship, he’s not high risk… when somebody has moved from 
very high to medium, we’ve had huge difficulties explaining that change to 
other agencies… it’s not a fear of downgrading, it’s a fear of reprisals (Mental 
health). 
 
5.15 Nevertheless, if ranking is clearly defined and understood, and movement between 
levels of risk is encouraged, practitioners would be more confident in downgrading as 
well as upgrading, not least with the backing of colleagues in other agencies: 
 
We have had 2 or 3 cases that have been downgraded from a ‘3’ to a ‘2’ 
because we have pulled together the MAPPA arrangements and had the multi-
agency planning and risk assessment pulled together, which has worked well 
and [offender] risk has been more managed so the imminence changes 
(MAPPA). 
 
5.16 However, some agency representatives felt, albeit reluctantly, that ranking of risk was 
mainly a cost cutting exercise, in the hope of allocating limited resources to those 
individuals with the most pressing needs. SPS staff mentioned that because of capacity 
issues within the estate, there may be a tendency to downgrade from secure to open 
conditions to free up cell space in the more secure establishments. Psychiatrists were 
also inferred to want to move patients on for similar reasons. 
 QUALITY ASSURANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
5.17 Generally, respondents felt that greater worker consistency, augmented by consistent 
approaches and tools, would improve both quality assurance and accountability. 
However, multi-agency working (see below) and fora such as MAPPA were seen 
positively by all respondents as being both mechanisms for quality assurance and for 
accountability, although there was concern that MAPPA coordinators – who have the 
unique position across agencies to provide some form of quality assurance and 
consistency – were not being used in that way but were seen by the Scottish 
Government to be primarily an administrative function. Equally, with regard to MAPPA, 
the Strategic Management Boards in each CJA were seen as a potential form of quality 
assurance and accountability, but as one respondent questioned: ‘who oversees the 
Strategic Management Board?’. 
 
5.18 The main forms of quality assurance, used to greater or lesser extents in each agency, 
included: case reviews, line management/supervision, case conferences, training, 
accreditation (of both tools and risk assessors), peer review, the MAPPA Annual Report 
and guidelines such as those prepared by the Risk Management Authority or the 
Scottish Government’s National Standards in Criminal Justice. From an intra-agency 
perspective, accountability was seen as coming from line management systems, ideally 
including the auditing of quality as well as quantity. However, from an inter-agency 
perspective, accountability was less clear cut, not least in respect of the MAPPA 
arrangements. One MAPPA coordinator suggested in relation to MAPPA that: ‘it’s all 
based on goodwill and willingness to cooperate’. Within such a forum there is no 
obvious hierarchy, and there may be tension between the responsibilities of agencies to 
other MAPPA members versus their responsibilities to their own respective constituents. 
Accountability structures as such, therefore, were not readily identifiable by the various 
agencies, not least when MAPPA representatives were not necessarily able to influence 
or veto their colleagues in other agencies, as one police respondent noted: 
 
Basically, it’s down to good working relationships and trying to resolve a lot of these 
issues, because I can’t actually influence the head of another agency to go back and 
change their decision. All I can do is share information and make sure that they’re 
aware that this information has been shared (Police). 
 
 
INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION 
 
I think sometimes there is a bit of a lively debate, where one agency might 
have a different view about the risk posed and have a different view therefore 
about how other agencies should respond, but… I’m very proud of the working 
relationships that we have with health, social work, the police and housing in 
relation to the management of offenders and I think that we have got 
confidence in each [other]… [if] one makes a decision, the others are 
comfortable with that (Social work). 
 
5.19 As exemplified by the above social work respondent from a relatively rural area with 
well-established multi-agency fora, the vast majority of agency representatives felt that 
inter-agency cooperation was good, albeit currently primarily in respect of sex offender 
information sharing and management. However, as noted in the preceding section, 
several respondents suggested that such relationships were based more on goodwill 
than on any statutory requirements, not least when there were no such requirements 
currently in respect of violent offenders. Whilst urban areas may have greater resource 
constraints or anxieties about multi-agency working being effective, both rural and urban 
respondents commented that  well-established networks over a prolonged period helped 
to consolidate good working relationships, as one urban-based social work respondent 
suggested: 
 
The Police and Social Work work pretty well together because we’re used to doing it. 
We’ve got a long history of doing it. There’s a lot of goodwill. A lot of very good work 
goes on (Social work). 
 
5.20 Legislation such as the Management of Sex Offenders, etc. (Scotland) Act 2006, policy 
guidance and protocols along the lines of the ISSG Concordat were seen as important 
elements in both ensuring and encouraging inter-agency cooperation and collaboration, 
and respondents in larger cities tended to rely on such statutory incentives compared 
with their counterparts in more rural areas. Fora such as MAPPA, high risk advisory 
groups mentioned in three local authorities or the NHS Care Programme Approach 
operating across Scotland were also cited as positive frameworks for inter-agency 
cooperation and information sharing. The frequency and consistency of contact helped 
such cooperation, as one high risk advisory group member commented: 
 
because we get together so often, in a multi-agency arena, I think the other 
agencies would feel quite confident… I mean, there is a different culture in 
social work than in the police, and that is quite right because they are looking at 
things from a different viewpoint, but I think that we have built up strong enough 
relationships where we can share… we can understand why social work might 
do things in a certain way. We also have a very clear understanding that the 
clinicians… have a clear view of how or why someone behaves in a certain 
way. We accept that. We respect each other’s ways of working (rural-based 
Social work). 
 
5.21  Such fora promoted a greater understanding between agencies of their responsibilities 
and limitations and also encouraged learning from each other when and if mistakes 
were made. Whilst the partner agencies may not necessarily agree on definitions or 
scenarios of risk, there was generally an awareness of, and sympathy for, the different 
roles and remits of the varying partners. MAPPA was also singled out by many 
respondents as being a template for positive intra- as well as inter-agency working, as 
one respondent commented: 
 
It’s having a huge impact. We are only in our infancy and we can already see 
that it is starting to fundamentally change how we organise our work and how 
we use assessment tools (MAPPA). 
 
5.22 Protocols in particular were seen as helpful reminders to agencies that multi-agency 
working was a requirement rather than just an ideal, and indeed, one respondent 
commented that without such protocols in respect of violent offenders, multi-agency 
working would be compromised: 
 
If you phoned up the police to… ask them for information, it would be highly, 
highly unlikely that they would give you that, because there is no protocol (city-
based Social work). 
 
5.23 However, protocols apart, it was suggested that offenders and victims should be 
included as partners within multi-agency arrangements and that sheriffs and other court 
officials would require guidance on any future multi-agency arrangements in relation to 
violent offenders. There was also deemed to be the need for a named liaison person per 
agency for violent offenders as was currently the case in some areas for sex offenders, 
which was seen by many respondents as being integral to effective inter-agency 
cooperation and understanding. Training was also seen as crucial in building skills and 
knowledge amongst practitioners of other agency roles and responsibilities. In this 
regard, there was an issue of practitioners deferring to their colleagues in other 
agencies more because of a lack of expertise rather than a lack of consensus, as one 
respondent illustrated thus: 
 
Psychiatrists’ and psychologists’ assessments are given more weight than the 
risk assessment… done by social work… It takes a really brave chair and a 
really brave meeting to override a psychiatrist or psychologist’s assessment 
and go with the social worker (MAPPA). 
 
5.24 In terms of legislation, there was concern expressed by a minority of respondents that 
whilst legislation required certain interventions, often agencies were unable - because of 
the limits on their own powers – to put those interventions into practice (notably the 
issue of police enforcement of certain MAPPA recommendations where the police had 
no statutory authority from within their own agency to intervene in the event of non-
compliance): 
 
We need something there when the top-end critical few don’t comply (Police). 
 
5.25 Equally, whilst social work or mental health practitioners, for example, may wish to 
intervene in a potentially violent situation, there was concern that other agencies may 
not be required to take a similar stance, as the following social work example illustrates: 
 
If someone… [intended] to harm somebody, but wouldn’t name who it was, 
where do you go with that? The police won’t respond until the crime is 
committed. He is a violent offender in the past but… because he is on 
probation for a very low level offence… where do you go with that? All you can 
do is record it (Social work). 
 
5.26 One mental health official also suggested, notably in respect of the Mental Health Act 
and Adults with Incapacity Act, that: 
 
there is an inexactness about Scottish legislation [which is] open to 
interpretation’ (Mental health). 
 
 
Barriers to effective inter-agency cooperation 
 
[There’s] a shared understanding about how things have to be. The challenge 
is how do we actually make that an efficient process, and we don’t fall over 
ourselves in endless inter-agency meetings talking about going round in circles 
(Social work). 
 
5.27 Multi-agency working can be extremely labour intensive, not least where senior 
management personnel are expected to meet around the table on a regular basis, as is 
the case with MAPPA. It also needs to be clearly delineated and with strict parameters 
and objectives, as the above quotation infers. For respondents overall, there was a 
concern in particular about the potential lack of resources, both financial and practical, 
for identifying, implementing and sustaining effective interventions for high risk violent 
offenders within a multi-agency environment. 
 
5.28 Equally, the different cultures and remits of the varying agencies were potential 
obstacles to good working relationships. For example, mental health input was seen by 
one social work respondent as only being possible where a clear diagnosis was made 
and that undiagnosed cases were left to social work alone to deal with. It was thus 
acknowledged that there was a lack of both a theoretical understanding of the concept 
of risk within and between agencies and a lack of a practical understanding of each 
agency’s philosophy, role, remit and objectives, and both these areas of understanding 
– theoretical and practical - should be seen as central to both intra- and inter-agency 
training. Equally, some respondents felt the need to rely on legislation or protocols to 
ensure the longer-term effectiveness of inter-agency cooperation. 
 
5.29 Likewise, there was a lack of compatibility within and between agencies in terms of 
information sharing, monitoring, quality assurance and accountability systems. In this 
regard, one of the main obstacles to inter-agency cooperation was seen as the 
mechanisms (technological or otherwise) for information sharing, with IT systems not 
being compatible or user-friendly across agencies, ViSOR and secure e-mail systems 
being mentioned in particular. ViSOR is not amenable to direct entries by social work 
staff, and agencies such as Social Work and SPS do not currently have secure e-mail 
facilities: 
 
We’ve got terrible problems just now trying to communicate with the police 
because electronically… we don’t have secure e-mail - although I’m told even 
when we do get secure e-mail, it won’t be truly secure… We can’t cut and 
paste into ViSOR for example… we have to look at our one screen, take the 
information from that and type it into another screen (Social work). 
 
Information exchange from police, fiscal, to courts, to social work is abysmal… 
there’s no framework for sharing information… You are reliant on asking the 
service user. Well you might as well not bother, eh? (Social work). 
 
TRAINING IN RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
5.30 Training was a major concern for all respondents in this study, and it was generally felt 
that it was piecemeal in its delivery and tended not to be undertaken until after the 
implementation of initiatives, such as the MAPPA arrangements or the introduction of a 
new risk assessment tool. The fact that practitioners were being trained in sex offending 
risk assessment tools up to two years after the start of the MAPPA arrangements, and 
the fact that the Scottish MAPPA guidelines were revised three times in the first eight 
months since their inception, suggested to some respondents that a violence risk 
assessment framework needed to be implemented following, rather than concurrent with 
such training. Conversely, however, it was deemed essential that training needed to be 
put into practice immediately following its delivery so that practitioners could utilise the 
skills learnt whilst these were fresh in their minds. There are, therefore, implications for 
the timing of training in order for it to coincide appropriately with the imminent 
implementation of any new initiative. 
 
5.31 Practitioners in any field need to be confident and comfortable with the tools they use to 
assess risk (Douglas & Ogloff, 2003), not least for those who have limited time in which 
to undertake such assessments. However, it was suggested by many respondents that 
training in risk assessment tools – whilst essential – was not necessarily the only 
training needed, and that wider training in, for example, the concept of risk, in its 
theoretical underpinnings and in risk formulation, was also needed. Whilst the SPS and 
the police have a national training centre and budget, social work, for example, does 
not. Yet national training was deemed imperative, not only within but across agencies 
and disciplines, not least if a standardised risk assessment framework was to be 
implemented nationally. Several different agency respondents also commented on the 
limited number of accredited or trained staff in risk assessment or risk assessment tools, 
not least when some tools required a level of expertise or clinical training to ensure that 
structured professional judgement could be utilised. 
 RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
5.32 Whilst most respondents were familiar with the numbers of registered sex offenders 
that they were currently dealing with, at least within the MAPPA arrangements, there 
was a fear (in terms of the logistics of assessment and management) that the number of 
violent offenders is going to be considerably greater than the number of sex offenders. 
As one police respondent remarked: ‘we could be talking thousands’. Within secure 
establishments, that proportion of violent to sex offenders could be even higher with, for 
example, one mental health respondent estimating that 98 per cent of State Hospital 
inpatients had been admitted following the commission of a violent offence. Calculating 
the numbers may require manual trawling through files because of limited electronic 
data on licencees, indictable offences, etc. Equally, there was concern about the 
existing violent offenders currently involved in the criminal justice and forensic mental 
health systems who would need to be risk assessed and classified prior to potential 
inclusion in MAPPA. 
 
5.33 In addition, there was concern that the numbers of violent offenders and the 
complexities of managing such a disparate and often volatile group in a cohesive and 
constructive way would impact greatly on agency workloads, finances and interventions. 
Those offenders who were eligible for MAPPA or subject to increased scrutiny through 
other multi-agency mechanisms were predicted to have significant resource 
implications, not only in terms of needing additional skilled staff both to assess and 
manage these violent offenders within specific multi-agency arrangements but also in 
terms of having effective and appropriate programmes and other interventions in place 
to manage, if not reduce, the risks posed by this particular group. One mental health 
respondent feared that there would be a dilution of effective practice because of such 
resource pressures: 
 
Another major influencing factor [apart from the availability of trained 
assessors] in terms of the input is resources… what you often get is risk 
management plans being modified to address the level of resources just as 
much as the level of risk, so what you end up [with] is a compromise (Mental 
health). 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
5.34 Risk assessment tools were not always familiar to each agency, not least since 
currently such tools are not standardised across all agencies; yet it is anticipated that 
the introduction and roll out of LS/CMI will address many of the concerns expressed by 
respondents about tools generally. Certainly, most respondents welcomed one 
standardised tool for initial assessments although stressed the need for any 
subsequent, more specialised, assessments to accommodate diversity, not only of 
offender types but also of agency remits and constituents. 
 
5.35 Risk assessments were undertaken for both rehabilitative reasons (focusing on the 
needs of the offender) and operational reasons (focusing on the requirements of the 
agency). Social work, the police and SPS seemed more likely to combine these 
functions of risk assessment whilst mental health staff were perhaps more able to focus 
on the rehabilitative approach because of their more medical treatment remit, their 
longer involvement with a patient, and their greater access to resources. However, 
wider public protection issues are increasingly a requirement across all agencies, which 
means that mental health professionals will have greater operational reasons for 
undertaking risk assessments in the future. 
 
5.36 Movement of offenders between MAPPA categories and levels of risk was seemingly 
dependent on philosophies, resources and professional confidence, but was currently 
quite limited – not least in terms of downgrading risk. This will obviously have 
implications for risk management of violent offenders who, once introduced to MAPPA, 
would have the potential to ‘swamp’ the system. Having the flexibility within protocols 
and guidance to ensure movement of offenders between levels of risk, as well as 
training in what constitutes each level of risk, would undoubtedly be welcomed by 
respondents once violent offenders are introduced into MAPPA, for example. 
 
5.37 Quality assurance mechanisms were seen to be augmented by multi-agency working 
although accountability may be less clear within an multi-agency forum such as MAPPA 
where the role of the Strategic Management Boards were seen as ill-defined and the 
MAPPA coordinators were considered not to be given enough responsibility and 
autonomy. 
 
5.38 Generally, however, inter-agency cooperation was viewed as very constructive and 
currently effective in respect of formal arrangements for sex offender and informal 
arrangements for other offenders. Legislation and protocols were helpful reminders of 
the need for inter-agency collaboration although perhaps the inclusion of other 
constituents, such as the courts, victim agencies and offenders themselves should also 
be included under the banner of ‘multi-agency’. Nevertheless, such collaboration 
required liaison with the appropriate people with the appropriate skills but there was a 
suggestion of a professional hierarchy currently which may result in some agencies or 
staff deferring to the expertise or designation of their colleagues in other agencies. It 
was also pointed out that legislative powers for multi-agency working may not be 
compatible with within-agency powers to deliver. For example, it was noted that the 
police currently do not necessarily have authorisation to implement or enforce certain 
existing MAPPA requirements. Equally, resources (both interventions and funding) and 
compatible IT systems for sharing information were seen as limited currently and this 
was a potential barrier to multi-agency effectiveness, as was the lack of multi-agency 
training in concepts of risk and risk assessment, an understanding of different agency 
remits and the availability of adequate services and resources to implement appropriate 
risk management plans. 
CHAPTER 6. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
6.1 This research has highlighted several issues in relation to the assessment of risk of 
violence and these are explored below under the following three headings: 
 
• Definitions, MAPPA classifications and risk levels; 
• Organisational arrangements; and 
• A risk of violence assessment framework. 
 
6.2 Where appropriate, recommendations are made under each heading to inform the Risk 
Management Authority’s developing work on a risk of violence assessment framework, 
not only in MAPPA but also within the wider context of multi-agency working in criminal 
justice and forensic mental health. As mentioned in Chapter 4, it should be borne in 
mind when reading this report that perceptions of risk and violence, and the assessment 
and management of violent offenders, were limited to 24 mainly line management staff 
rather than front-line practitioners across the agencies. Equally, the discussions at 
interview about formalising the assessment and management of violent offenders were 
by necessity hypothetical, since violent offenders in Scotland have not, as yet, been 
under official scrutiny – not least in MAPPA. 
 
MAPPA CLASSIFICATIONS, DEFINITIONS AND LEVELS OF RISK 
 
6.3 MAPPA classifications in England and Wales have had a far longer period in which to 
‘bed in’ than they have to date in Scotland. Thus, the 24 respondents interviewed for 
this research were speaking without the benefit of hindsight about classifications which 
had not – in respect of violent offenders – been put into practice, and even those 
relating to sex offenders had only been in operation for six months at the time of 
interview. That said, these respondents had contradictory views about the MAPPA 
classifications, considering them to be both too rigid (in terms of restricting MAPPA 
involvement to those convicted on indictment and to those subject to supervision on 
probation or on licence) and too loose (notably in respect of category 3 offenders, which 
was seen as perhaps too vague a ‘catch-all’ category).  As Chapter 1 noted, experience 
in England and Wales shows that Category 3 offenders constitute a minority (6%) of all 
MAPPA categories (Ministry of Justice, 2007) and that clear guidelines and training 
have been developed to ensure that these arrangements focus on the ‘critical few’, 
irrespective of the classification criteria (Kemshall et al, 2005; Wood and Kemshall, 
2007).  It has also been suggested in England and Wales (Wood and Kemshall, 2007) 
that MAPPA involvement need not end when supervision or licence requirements end.  
For example, voluntary contact can be encouraged, and the police can equally maintain 
a ‘watching brief’.   
 
6.4 Whilst respondents also suggested that risk of re-offending and risk of harm should be 
clearly delineated, the LS/CMI assessment tool should be able to address such 
concerns.  Equally, there was concern expressed from a Community Justice Authority 
(CJA) perspective that MAPPA classifications currently did not fully address the issue of 
public protection or public fear of crime, both of which are priorities of the CJAs.  
However, targeting of those who pose the most serious risk of harm is the main priority 
of MAPPA; broadening its remit to cover all eventualities would be counterproductive 
and could lead to possible netwidening and uptariffing of offenders. 
  
6.5 There is also a need for stricter gatekeeping and screening mechanisms for reviewing 
and possibly downgrading risk.  For example, experience in Scotland thus far suggests 
that MAPPA level 2 sex offenders are currently a burgeoning group with no clear 
rationale for their inclusion at that level.  There was also concern by MAPPA 
coordinators in particular that level 1 offenders could not be easily monitored for either 
downgrading or upgrading.  National consistency was deemed desirable in how workers 
perceive each level of risk (very high, high, medium and low), not least when different 
agencies, and indeed different geographical areas (e.g., urban versus rural) have 
different risk tolerance and threshold levels.  It was seen as both welcomed and 
important to have clear guidelines from the Scottish Government and the Risk 
Management Authority on risk levels, not only for staff across the main agencies but 
also for sentencers. The MAPPA guidance also notes that risk levels should also reflect 
the level of management required from agencies as well as the level of risk posed by 
the offender. 
 
6.6 Chapters 3 and 4 highlighted several differences between sex offenders and violent 
offenders which were considered to make working with the latter within the context of a 
risk of violence assessment framework somewhat problematic.  For example, violent 
offenders were, perhaps mistakenly, seen as more heterogeneous, less compliant, less 
selective/consistent in their choice of victim and more prone to offending under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol.  Equally, the literature review suggests that much of the 
legislation relies on the capabilities of the assessors to ascertain risk levels, yet there is 
no clear-cut distinction between who may be violent and who may be sexually 
aggressive.  Certainly, violent offending is more culturally and geographically specific 
and less amenable to prediction of future risk, but without further research on the 
characteristics and motivations of both sexual and violent offenders, it cannot be 
assumed that MAPPA will be any more challenged by the inclusion of violent offenders 
than it currently is with sex offenders. 
 
Recommendation 1: that the Scottish Government and the Risk Management Authority carry 
out active dissemination and briefing on the MAPPA guidance in order to establish a 
complementary language of risk, risk definitions and risk level classifications across all 
agencies working with violent offenders in MAPPA; 
Recommendation 2: that specialist training for staff on risk definitions, classifications and 
levels of risk be undertaken; in the short term, the ‘Assessing and Managing Risk’ CD Rom 
recently completed by Hazel Kemshall and colleagues for the Risk Management Authority 
could be used to help practitioners to operationalise appropriate criteria; 
Recommendation 3: that categories of offender and levels of risk within each MAPPA 
category be monitored on an annual basis so as to ensure that resources are targeted at the 
appropriate levels and that movement between levels of risk is based on sound risk 
assessment, management and review; 
Recommendation 4: that the operation of MAPPA in Scotland be evaluated within the next 
12-24 months and on a regular basis thereafter to review the operation of risk definitions, 
levels and classifications and to examine the processes of identification, referral and 
assessment of both violent and sexual offenders. 
 
ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Quality assurance and accountability 
 
6.7 Kemshall et al (2005) and Wood and Kemshall (2007) note that the MAPPA 
classifications in England and Wales have been most effective when set in the context 
of good guidance, training, quality assurance and inter-agency commitment.  Likewise, 
respondents at interview suggested that greater worker consistency and effectiveness 
would enhance quality assurance and accountability, although they also suggested that 
whilst intra-agency mechanisms were relatively robust, there was less clarity about such 
mechanisms for inter-agency working.  However, clear guidelines, protocols and 
legislation would ensure better quality assurance and accountability systems across 
agencies and geographical boundaries. 
 
6.8 The literature suggests that the greater the level of inter-agency cooperation, the higher 
the consensus ratings of risk of violence and, as was suggested by respondents in 
Chapter 5, the higher the confidence and commitment of each agency in making 
defensible decisions.  The introduction of MAPPA procedures seems to have been 
helpful here, both in terms of increased information sharing and increased confidence 
due to joint decision making and shared responsibility. Whilst all agencies expressed a 
desire for greater understanding across agencies of their roles, remits and cultures in 
meeting multi-agency expectations, it was acknowledged that there were often 
variations in culture, policy or practice which created challenges for inter-agency 
cooperation.  The literature review also found evidence of failures in information sharing 
and a lack of a common or complementary language of risk, with workers tending to 
make assumptions about the knowledge and practice base of their colleagues in other 
agencies. 
 
6.9 In the spirit of social inclusion and collaboration, several respondents suggested that 
other partners not perhaps adequately involved currently in the assessment process 
should be represented, including offenders themselves, victims, sheriffs and court 
personnel.  It was also considered helpful to have a named liaison person in each 
agency with specific knowledge and expertise in the assessment and management of 
violent offenders.  However, there are obviously resource and training implications for 
this.  Protocols were seen in both the literature and the qualitative interviews as 
promoting more effective multi-agency working, though legislation or protocols which 
required joint working between agencies also needed to be complementary with the 
existing legislative capacities of agencies to deliver. 
 
Recommendation 5: that all agencies are required to establish protocols and memoranda of 
agreement covering processes for the identification, classification, referral and assessment 
of violent offenders within MAPPA  prior to violent offenders coming on stream; 
Recommendation 6: that the Information Sharing Steering Group Concordat be revised to 
include violent as well as sexual offenders; 
Recommendation 7: that the powers and statutory responsibilities of each agency are 
compatible with any inter-agency requirements, in terms of joint assessments, home visiting, 
enforcement and breach of conditions; 
Recommendation 8: that joint training be delivered on the remits and responsibilities of the 
varying agencies involved in violence risk assessment, to enable a greater understanding of 
the limitations and opportunities for multi-agency working. 
 
Training 
 
6.10 Training was a major issue for respondents in this research, both within and between 
agencies. There was some criticism of the timing of training events, not least when 
training in the sex offender arrangements within MAPPA will be ongoing two years after 
their implementation. It was hoped that similar training in violence risk assessment could 
happen before rather than concurrent with the introduction of violent offenders into 
MAPPA. It was also seen as important to not only train workers in the risk assessment 
tools but also in the wider concept of risk, in risk formulation and in theories of risk and 
violence. Multi-agency training and the national resourcing of such training was also 
deemed imperative. 
 
Recommendation 9: that training be funded nationally, via the Scottish Government and the 
Risk Management Authority, that it be undertaken across as well as within agencies, that it 
include the concepts and theories of risk and risk formulation and that it is delivered well in 
advance of violent offenders coming on stream in MAPPA. 
[see also Recommendations 2 and 8 above] 
 
Resources 
 
6.11 The fears of respondents about the number of violent offenders who would be eligible 
for MAPPA inclusion may be unfounded, given the stable number of violent versus 
sexual offenders in MAPPAs in England and Wales since its implementation there. 
However, there was concern that violent offenders could not be subsumed within 
existing arrangements without further financial resources and interventions. 
 
Recommendation 10: that an audit of existing numbers, staffing, budgetary and other 
constraints within existing MAPPA arrangements be carried out across the 8 CJAs to 
ascertain projected estimates of resources once violent offenders come on stream; 
Recommendation 11: that ViSOR, if found to be effective following the pilot evaluations, be 
made more ‘user friendly’ and compatible between agencies and that each agency has 
access to secure e-mail systems and other necessary IT requirements for effective multi-
agency working. 
 
A RISK OF VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
6.12 The lessons learnt from current MAPPA arrangements could greatly inform the 
implementation of a violence risk assessment framework.  MAPPA was generally seen 
as a positive, constructive and effective means of both encouraging inter-agency 
collaboration and managing the risks posed under certain offender categories, once 
those definitions and classifications had been ironed out.  It was generally felt that the 
framework used for sex offenders currently within MAPPA could be replicated for violent 
offenders, but existing MAPPA arrangements would need to be fit for purpose through 
having a standardised initial assessment tool, clear criteria for the target group in terms 
of referral and assessment and further training and multi-agency collaboration on risk 
classifications and definitions across and within agencies.  Some respondents felt that 
there needed to be dedicated staff for violent offenders as there were for sex offenders, 
who were expert in that field.  However, the literature review and experience in England 
and Wales suggests that this may be counterproductive since many of the issues in the 
assessment and management of both violent and sexual offenders are similar and to 
separate them out into two streams may result in a dilution of the support given to both.  
However, it may be beneficial for MAPPA coordinators to take on a more proactive 
sifting role than the administrative one envisaged for them in the current arrangements 
(Kemshall et al., 2005), and to have the skills to differentiate between violent and sexual 
offenders where necessary.  
 
6.13 There are challenges to the establishment of a violence assessment framework, not 
least the heterogeneity of violent offending, and the fact that a proportion of offenders 
will present with non-violent offences but still cause concern.  Practitioners in this study 
were seeking a general, ‘all embracing’ risk assessment tool to enable the early and 
‘resource lean’ identification of violent offenders for further in-depth risk assessment and 
potential referral to MAPPA.  It is unlikely that the current ‘wish-list’ of our respondents 
can be met (and potentially this may never be possible).  However, an initial risk 
assessment tool for violence could be adapted from those currently available and 
piloted for use within MAPPA.  Such a tool should meet as many as possible of the 
criteria set by McIvor and Kemshall (2002) and those used in the Risk Assessment 
Tools Evaluation Directory (RATED) (RMA, 2006).  From the tools reviewed in this 
report, the primary candidate is LS/CMI, although HCR-20 (currently in use for mentally 
disordered offenders) has the potential for adaptation to a wider group of offenders.  
Whilst some mental health colleagues prefer RAMAS, that tool is more comprehensive, 
 Recommendation 12: that the Risk Management Authority, in consultation with Criminal 
Justice policy leads, should consider the adoption of a single initial risk assessment tool for 
use across all agencies; 
Recommendation 13: that the use and effectiveness of the tool should be evaluated after a 
two year period. 
 
6.14 A range of risk assessment tools specific to different types of violent offence and 
offender will be required following initial screening to facilitate comprehensive referrals 
to MAPPA.  A number of tools have been reviewed in this study and in more detail by 
Farrington and colleagues in their concurrent study in terms both of such tools’ 
usefulness in assessing differing types of violent offending and of their relevance to 
differing populations and ability to respond to the diversity and ‘subtlety’ of violence.  
Further, the RATED document (RMA, 2006) has already established the ‘track-record’ 
and utility of a number of these tools.  It is reasonable to suggest that this should be the 
starting point for selecting and endorsing a range of violence assessment tools for use 
by MAPPA.  All such tools will require some degree of training or briefing, and this will 
have short-term costs and consequences for MAPPA personnel.  However, the long-
term benefits of more accurate risk assessments and better matching of interventions 
and risk management plans to risk factors should outweigh such costs.   
 
Recommendation 14: that MAPPA personnel will need training in the use of specialist 
violence risk assessment tools, as documented in the Risk Management Authority’s RATED 
report, and that such training be provided in consultation with the Risk Management 
Authority, drawing on its own training programme and the commissioned CD Rom 
‘Assessing and Managing Risk’. 
 
6.15 Risk assessment tools will need to be supported by the provision of full and compatible 
information from varying agencies about the offender in order to assist professionals in 
making informed judgements at all stages of risk assessment and management.  Such 
structured professional judgements are seen to provide ‘value added’ to risk 
assessment and management in both the literature review (De Vogel and De Ruiter 
2006; Douglas and Ogloff 2003; Tiffin and Caplan 2004) and in the qualitative interviews 
for this and previous studies (see Kemshall et al 2005; Wood and Kemshall 2007). 
 6.16 Minimum standards for a MAPPA referral and for information required by a Multi-
Agency Public Protection Panel (MAPPP) have been set by Kemshall et al (2005) for 
English and Welsh MAPPAs and are to a large extent already reflected in the Scottish 
MAPPA Guidance.  These are transferable to the Scottish context.  The ‘Standards and 
Guidelines for Risk Assessment’ (RMA, 2006) and the ‘Standards and Guidelines: Risk 
Management of Offenders subject to an Order for Lifelong Restriction’ (RMA 2007) 
outline key criteria for risk analysis and risk formulation, and whilst both these standards 
relate to offenders under the Order for Lifelong Restriction (OLR), they state best 
practice standards that are, in principle, transferable to other categories of offender. 
These standards and their consistent use will be crucial to formulating an evidenced 
view of the level of risk presented by individual offenders, their subsequent classification 
under MAPPA, and the risk management plans subsequently devised and delivered. 
 
Recommendation 15: that the Risk Management Authority, in partnership with Criminal 
Justice MAPPA leads, issues and disseminates minimum standards for referral and panel 
information, using current Scottish MAPPA Guidance and the RMA standards. 
 
6.17  Risk formulation guidance, as outlined by the Risk Management Authority, could 
helpfully inform the decision making and risk planning of MAPPA, at all levels, but 
particularly at levels 2 and 3.  There is potential for the structure and content of risk 
formulations to assist with appropriately deciding risk levels and in informing subsequent 
plans.  At level 2 it has the potential to ‘test’ whether cases actually do meet the criteria 
for level 2 or whether they can be managed at a single agency level, and to potentially 
reduce the tendency for inflation at level 2 in the early stages of MAPPA operation (a 
tendency identified by Kemshall et al, 2005).  Respondents in the present study 
identified inflation at level 2 as a pressing issue and feared the increase in inflation once 
violent offenders were incorporated into MAPPA.  Early action to combat this is 
therefore required.  MAPPA risk levels should be based on robust and rigorous 
assessments of the nature of the violence, its severity in the past and its potential 
severity in the future, the imminence of the risk, its frequency and likelihood. The RMA’s 
standards and guidelines for risk assessment and risk formulation in informing risk 
management require all these elements to be considered; they should be core to all 
subsequent case reviews and may assist in the appropriate down-grading (and indeed 
up-grading) of risk.  
 
Recommendation 16:  that the Risk Management Authority should encourage the 
development of a comprehensive risk management plan that is informed by the risk 
assessment process and the subsequent risk formulation and is reviewed through ongoing 
risk assessment. 
 
6.18 Risk management plans should be well targeted and matched to the identified risk 
factors (Kemshall et al, 2005).  Chapter 3 contains reviews of effective approaches to 
risk management in both theory and practice.  Effective approaches to risk (drawn from 
extensive literature reviews) have been significantly embedded into the MAPPA 
Guidance and the RMA’s Standards and Guidelines: Risk Management of Offenders 
subject to an Order for Lifelong Restriction (2007).  There is potential both to revise and 
extend the Guidance and the Standards in line with emerging research.  However, the 
short term objective should be the active dissemination of best practice, with training 
and support for staff in effective risk management.  Equally, risk management plans for 
violent offenders should be subject to evaluation, including trends in recidivism rates 
following MAPPA involvement. The key components of a violence assessment and 
management framework, based on the above, is set out in Figure 1 below. 
 
Recommendation 17:  that the Risk Management Authority disseminates and supports 
training in risk management; in the short term this could be delivered through existing and 
planned programmes, and the CD Rom, ‘Assessing and Managing Risk’; 
Recommendation 18: that evaluation research on the impact of MAPPA risk management 
plans on violent offender recidivism should be commissioned. 
 
 
6.19 This report aims to inform the development and implementation of a violence 
assessment and management framework for use not only in MAPPA but also in the 
wider context of criminal justice interventions.  The report drew on an extensive 
international literature review as well as in-depth interviews with key personnel in the 
relevant agencies, namely, social work, SPS, the police, the Parole Board, forensic 
mental health and victim agencies.  The findings suggest that the seriousness and 
varying impacts of violence are indeed a challenge to both risk classification, 
assessment and management, but that there is a strong commitment within and 
between agencies to further the aims of multi-agency arrangements such as MAPPA 
and to build on the success of MAPPA to date in addressing the needs of offenders, 
agency personnel and the wider public. 
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Figure 1: A Violence Assessment and Management Framework 
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 APPENDIX 1: PHASE I - INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
 
 
ASSESSING RISK OF VIOLENCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR PRACTICE 
 
Initials of respondent:  Agency:   Date:
   
 
The University of Strathclyde has been commissioned by the Risk Management Authority to 
undertake a study of risk of violence, including an evaluation of current and developing 
research, policy and practice and issues of commonality or difference between agencies in 
relation to risk assessment of violent offenders. This initial phase of the work includes 
interviews with key agencies in relation to policy and practice and I would like to ask you for 
your views about approaches to risk of violence assessment, inter-agency cooperation and 
your views of the procedures adopted for assessing risk of violence within and between 
agencies in Scotland. The interview should not take longer than an hour and I would ideally 
like to tape record our discussion, if that is acceptable to you. The information you give us 
will be treated in confidence and no names will be mentioned in the report that we submit to 
the Risk Management Authority.     
 
GENERAL OVERVIEW 
 
1. Could you tell me what your role is in relation to risk of violence assessment in this 
agency? Designation, length of time in post. 
 
2. How would you define risk of violence? Does your agency have a specific ‘working’ 
definition? 
 
3. What are your agency’s reasons for doing risk of violence assessments? 
 
4. How do you use such assessments in your agency? 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES 
 
5. What are the procedures for implementing a risk of violence assessment in your agency? 
 
6. What are the procedures for monitoring a risk of violence assessment in your agency? 
 
7. Do you have specific guidelines for risk of violence assessment? [take note to get copy] 
 
8. Do you think your procedures are compatible with those of other relevant agencies? 
 
9. What risk assessment and screening tools would you use or recommend? 
 
10. What are their strengths/weaknesses and advantages/disadvantages? 
 
11. How is the level of risk determined (e.g., actuarial or professional judgement or both)? 
 
12. In what ways does your response vary according to the assessed level of risk (e.g., low, 
medium, high)? 
 
13. Are you familiar with RA3 and 4, LSI-R, LS/CMI and HCR-20? 
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 14. If so, what do you see as their strengths/weaknesses and advantages/disadvantages? 
 
15. How useful/flexible are the above tools in terms of specific groups (e.g., young people, 
women offenders, first time offenders, those with mental health problems, substance 
misuse, etc.). 
 
16. Do you see any difficulties for practitioners in terms of using actuarial tools alongside 
professional judgement? 
 
17. In what ways does current legislation affect your agency’s work in relation to risk of 
violence (e.g., Criminal Justice Scotland Act; Custodial Sentences and Weapons Bill; 
Management of Offenders Act; Data Protection Act; Human Rights)? 
 
18. What procedures are in place for quality assurance? 
 
19. What procedures are in place for accountability? 
 
INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION 
 
20. What joint assessment procedures do you have in place for inter-agency working in 
relation to risk of violence assessment? 
 
21. Although at an early stage, what do you consider are the strengths and limitations of 
MAPPA (including guidance, legislation, risk assessment tools, inter-agency 
cooperation)? 
 
22. Which would you say are – and should be - the key agencies involved in MAPPAs in 
Scotland? 
 
23. How has MAPPA been implemented [in your agency/in your area]? 
 
24. What is your opinion of the potential of MAPPA in terms of cooperation and information 
sharing, notably in relation to risk of violence assessment? 
 
25. Is there a shared understanding of risk and of violence between all the relevant agencies 
(e.g., definition, threshold, level of risk, language, response)? 
 
26. Do all the relevant agencies agree on the type and reliability of risk assessment tools for 
violent offenders (in principle and in practice)? 
 
27. What is your perception of inter-agency accountability (standards, monitoring, review and 
managing mistakes)? 
 
28. What are your agency’s aims for the future in terms of risk of violence assessment? 
 
29. To what extent are these aims compatible with other relevant agencies’ aims? 
 
 
KEY ISSUES AND TENSIONS 
 
30. What do you feel are the key issues in assessing risk of violence both from a policy and 
a practice perspective? 
 
31. What do you feel are the key tensions in assessing risk of violence both from a policy 
and a practice perspective? 
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FINAL QUESTIONS 
 
32. Are there any other issues that we haven’t raised already that might be relevant, or is 
there anything else that you would like to say in relation to risk of violence assessment? 
 
33. Could you possibly supply me with copies of the relevant documents that your agency 
refers to in respect of risk of violence assessment? 
 
34. Finally, could I ask you who the key practitioners are in your agency in respect of risk of 
violence assessment as we will want to interview staff within the next couple of months 
about practice issues and about specific risk assessment tools? 
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 APPENDIX 2: PHASE III   - INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
 
 
ASSESSING RISK OF VIOLENCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR PRACTICE 
 
Initials of respondent:  Agency:  Date: 
 
 
 
The University of Strathclyde has been commissioned by the Risk Management Authority to 
undertake a study of risk of violence, including an evaluation of current and developing 
research, policy and practice and issues of commonality or difference between agencies in 
relation to risk assessment of violent offenders. We have undertaken a literature review and 
interviewed key policy people about risk of violence assessment. This final phase of the work 
involves discussions with key practitioners undertaking risk of violence assessments, and I 
would like to ask you for your views about approaches to risk of violence assessment, inter-
agency cooperation and your views of the procedures adopted for assessing risk of violence 
within and between agencies in Scotland. The interview should not take longer than an hour 
and I would ideally like to tape record our discussion, if that is acceptable to you. The 
information you give us will be treated in confidence and no names will be mentioned in the 
report that we submit to the Risk Management Authority.  
    
General: 
 
1. Could you tell me what your role is in relation to risk of violence assessment in this 
agency? [Designation, length of time in post]. 
 
Definition of risk: 
 
[Show respondent the MAPPA definitions of risk of harm, serious harm and violence] 
 
2. How do these definitions compare with your agency’s working definition [if any].  
 
3. Are these definitions compatible with other agencies’ definitions (e.g., police, social work, 
health) in terms of threshold, level of risk, language, response)? 
 
4. Do you agree with these definitions? [If not, what would you change about them?] 
 
5. How and why do you differentiate between risk of harm, risk of serious harm and risk of 
violence? 
 
Procedures: 
 
6. What are your agency’s reasons for doing risk of violence assessments? 
 
7. What are the procedures for implementing a risk of violence assessment in your agency? 
 
8. To what extent should such a process include specific groups such as women, people 
with mental health issues, domestic violence offenders and young offenders? 
 
9. How do you use such assessments in your agency? 
 
10. What are the procedures for monitoring a risk of violence assessment in your agency? 
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11. Do you have specific guidelines for risk of violence assessment? [take note to get copy] 
 
12. Do you think your procedures are compatible with those of other relevant agencies? 
 
Tools: 
 
13. How much do you rely on risk assessment tools as opposed to professional judgement, 
and are levels obtained from tools ever overridden by professional judgement (upgraded 
or downgraded)? 
 
14. What are your views on RA1-4 in terms of its effectiveness in screening risk of violence? 
 
15. Has your agency used any of the following tools in preparing violence risk assessments, 
and if so what is your opinion of them: 
 
 Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) 
 Violence Risk Scale (VRS) 
 Risk Matrix 2000 (RM2000) 
 Historical Clinical Risk – 20 (HCR-20) 
 
16. In your view, do all the relevant agencies agree on the type and reliability of risk 
assessment tools for work with violent offenders (in principle and in practice)? 
 
Ranking of risk: 
 
17. How do you grade different levels and types of violence? 
 
18. How is the level of risk determined (e.g., actuarial or professional judgement or both)?  
 
19. In what ways do intervention and review vary according to the assessed level of risk 
(e.g., low, medium, high)? 
 
20. Which types of violent offender would you envisage being dealt with through MAPPA as 
opposed to the usual channels? 
 
21. How might violent offenders move between MAPPA levels – who would lead and what 
emphasis would be put on each ranking? 
 
22. Should time limits be imposed on criminal justice system involvement (including MAPPA) 
for violent offenders, and if so, on what criteria? 
 
23. What are your views on the criteria and procedures for ‘downgrading’ offenders involved 
in MAPPA? 
 
Quality assurance: 
 
24. What quality assurance mechanisms do you have in place for risk of violence 
assessment (e.g., inter-rater reliability, supervision, research, audit, training)? 
 
25. How are inter-agency decisions monitored in relation to risk of violence assessment? 
 
26. What accountability procedures do you have in place for risk of violence assessment? 
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 27. What is your perception of inter-agency accountability (e.g., standards, monitoring, 
review, potential conflict of interest and managing mistakes)? 
 
Inter-agency cooperation 
 
28. What are the different agency remits and cultures and how do they affect reasons for risk 
assessments and risk management [probe for each agency]? 
 
29. Do you know if your agency has signed up to the Information Sharing Steering Group 
(ISSG) Concordat? 
 
30. If so, how does this protocol work in practice with regard to violence risk assessment?  
 
31. Do you have any other arrangements in place with other agencies for violence risk 
assessment? 
 
32. If so, how do these arrangements work in practice with regard to violence risk 
assessment?  
 
33. Is there anything that helps or hinders such arrangements (legislation, policy directives, 
resources, etc)? 
 
34. What difficulties do you have in sharing (giving and receiving) information both within 
your own agency and between your agency and other agencies (logistics, confidentiality, 
timing, protocols, quality)? 
 
MAPPA: 
 
35. What do you see as the role and capacity of MAPPA in dealing with violent offenders? 
 
36. What is your perception of the meaning and role of the ‘lead agency’ in MAPPA, and who 
should that be in respect of violent offenders? 
 
37. What is your opinion of the potential of MAPPA in terms of cooperation and information 
sharing, notably in relation to risk of violence assessment? 
 
Issues and tensions 
 
38. What do you feel are the key issues in assessing risk of violence both from a policy and 
a practice perspective? 
 
39. What do you feel are the key tensions in assessing risk of violence both from a policy 
and a practice perspective? 
 
The future: 
 
40. What are your agency’s aims and expectations for the future in terms of risk of violence 
assessment? 
 
41. To what extent are these aims and expectations compatible with other relevant 
agencies? 
 
42. Are there any other issues that we haven’t raised that might be relevant, or is there 
anything else that you would like to say in relation to risk of violence assessment? 
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